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The poor  can and do save, but often use formal or informal  instruments that  have high risk, high cost, 
and  limited  functionality.  This  could  lead  to  undersaving  compared  to  a  world  without  market  or 
behavioral frictions. Undersaving  can  have  important  welfare  consequences: variable consumption, 
low resilience to  shocks,  and  foregone  profitable investments. We lay out  five sets of constraints that 
may hinder  the adoption and effective usage of savings products and services by the poor:  transaction 
costs,  lack  of  trust and  regulatory barriers, information and  knowledge gaps,  social  constraints, and 
behavioral biases.  We  discuss  each  in  theory, and  then  summarize related empirical  evidence,  with  a 
focus on recent field experiments. We then put  forward key open areas for research  and practice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Savings  mobilization  is  critical  for  individual  and  societal  welfare.  At  the 
individual level,  savings  help  households smooth consumption  and finance 
productive  investments in  human and  business  capital.  At  the  macroeconomic 
level, savings rates  are strongly  predictive  of future  economic growth. 
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Yet  barriers to  saving  exist for  many,  particularly the  world’s  poor. Market 
frictions,  including  transaction costs, lack of trust,  and  regulatory barriers,  hinder 
the supply of savings products. Only 22 percent  of adults  worldwide  report  having 
saved  at  a  formal financial  institution  in  the  past 12  months, and 77  percent of 
adults living on less than $2 a  day report not having an account at a  formal financial 
institution (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). Mounting evidence also suggests 
that various demand-side constraints depress  saving even among those with  access. 
Social  claimants, lack  of  knowledge, and/or behavioral biases  may lead  to  sub-
optimal saving. 
Despite these barriers, evidence suggests that the poor have substantial (latent) 
demand  for  savings.  Household  surveys  indicate  that  the  poor  do  have  some 
surplus  that  they  use  for  non-essential  expenditures  (Banerjee  and  Duflo,  2007). 
Similarly,  detailed  “diary”  studies  document  complexity  in  poor  households’ 
financial  portfolios  and  highlight  the  demand  for  small  irregular  flows  to  be 
aggregated into lump sums  for household or business investment (Rutherford, 
2000; Collins  et al., 2009). Even  when  formal  savings products are  unavailable or 
unaffordable, the poor  often  save under  mattresses,  in informal  groups,  and/or in 
livestock.  These  patterns do  not square easily  with  classic  poverty/liquidity trap 
explanations for persistent poverty. 
Does  removing  barriers  to  saving  produce  tangible  benefits?  Microfinance 
institutions (MFIs)  and many donors  and policymakers  are betting that the answer 
is  yes,  in  a  (double-)bottom-line  sense.  Microfinance  institutions  are  often 
broadening  their initial  focus  on  microcredit to  now  include  the  provision of 
savings products.1 MFIs have 72 million microsavings clients to date, compared to 
94  million  microcredit  clients  (Microfinance  Information  Exchange,  2012).  The 
recent  literature measuring the  impacts of  savings  access  starts with  Burgess  and 
Pande (2005), which uses a natural experiment  on bank expansion (i.e., both  credit 
and  savings)  in  India  from  1977  to  1990  to  identify  a  2.22  percentage  point 
reduction in rural  poverty  per  1 percentage point  increase  in the  share  of savings 
held  by rural banks. More recently, field experiments are  producing a growing body 
of evidence on impacts  (Ashraf  et al., 2006a, 2010; Brune et al., 2013; Dupas and 
Robinson,  2013a, 2013b; Prina, 2013).  These studies show large positive impacts 
on various  outcomes  from improvements in access to and usage of formal savings, 
and  hint  at  more  transformative impacts than found thus  far in similar evaluations 
of microcredit (Banerjee, 2013). 
Although savings is becoming  a priority in the  development agenda,  it is not 
clear a priori  that  under-saving is a widespread  problem  and that  everyone should 
save  more,  at  least  in  the  form  of  additional  financial  assets  or  investment. 
Policymakers  and practitioners often overlook  the possibility that  the best route to 
saving  more is  to  pay  down existing  debt. In  other cases  the  utility benefits  of 
current  consumption  are  high.  On  balance,  several  studies  in  more-developed 
countries have found that people get  their savings  and consumption decisions about 
right  over the life-cycle (Scholz et al., 2006), although debate continues to 
 
1This expansion in the focus of microfinance also includes offering insurance products, new payment 
channels, and educational interventions;  see for example, Radcliffe and Voorhies (2012) for an overview 
of  electronic payment channels for  the  poor, and  Xu  and  Zia  (2012) for  a  review  of  “pro-savings” 
financial education and literacy training. 
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rage  on  this  question  (Poterba  et  al.,  2013).  Despite  widespread  interest  in,  for 
example,  “nudging” people  to  save more,  it is not  clear  whether, where,  to  what 
extent,  and for whom such nudges would be desirable. 
We  group potential explanations  for  “undersaving”  into  five categories. By 
“undersaving” we mean  a lower level of savings than one would  have in a world 
with  perfect  markets  (perfect  information,  zero  transaction  costs,  and  perfect 
competition amongst  financial institutions) and  fully attentive,  fully rational, fully 
consistent, etc.,  decision-making. The  five  categories of  frictions are  as  follows: 
transaction costs, lack of trust and  regulatory barriers, information and  knowledge 
gaps,  social  constraints, and behavioral biases.  We review theory and evidence  on 
each  in  Section  2.  These  categories  are  not  meant  to  be  exhaustive,  or  even 
mutually exclusive; rather they  are  meant to organize our thinking about what could 
go wrong  in markets for  savings  vehicles, and  about how  to  fix any inefficiencies 
or inequities  that would motivate (policy) intervention. 
We  largely  restrict the  review  in  this  paper to  the  literature from  studies  in 
developing  country sites, with footnotes pointing  readers  to relevant  related  work 
from  the  U.S.  or  other  more-developed  countries.  In  certain  cases  we  highlight 
studies from more-developed  nations,  when we think  they offer novel insights into 
the design of interventions or directions  for future  research. 
We focus our review on less-developed countries  (LDCs)  for several reasons. 
First, from  a  humanitarian  perspective, the  potential social  impact from  solving 
market problems  is likely greater,  given starker  poverty  and  market imperfections 
(e.g., less competitive  formal  markets  for savings products). Second,  development 
economics  has  a deeper  recent  literature, using experimental methods to  establish 
causality,  on  the  relative  effectiveness  of  different  financial  products.2  This 
empirical  focus  on  attribution  often  allows  more  precision  in  terms  of  testing 
theories  of consumer behavior.  Our focus is on just that:  using experiments to help 
test  across theories  of  consumer choice  and  financial  decision-making over  time. 
This often results in the study being embedded inside what one may call a “product 
test.” The LDC focus  also includes  a broader range  of inquiry;  for  instance, credit 
market frictions  and  social  claimants, which  are  less likely to  be  relevant  in  the 
U.S.  and other more-developed countries. We  emphasize, however, that we do  not 
argue  that  LDC  denizens  are  fundamentally  more  “behavioral”  than  their 
counterparts in  richer  countries (although they  may  be  more  subject  to  scarcity 
impinging  on decision-making along the lines of Shah et al. (2012) and Mani  et al. 
(2013), as we discuss below). 
Section  3 synthesizes a few key patterns from  the  body  of evidence collected 
so  far  on  savings  constraints,  and  the  impacts  of  relaxing  them,  in  developing 
countries.  Section 4 discusses measurement and methodological issues involved in 
accurately estimating impacts of expanded access to and  usage of savings products. 
Section  5 outlines  a  way  forward,  compiling  a  set  of  open  questions  from  our 
detailed  reviews  in  the  previous  sections.  We  focus  on  identifying  needs  and 
opportunities to  improve  products offered  by the  supply  side and  choices by the 
demand side, in order  to improve  long-term welfare. 
 
 
2This  is changing (see, for  example,  http://www.poverty-action.org/ushouseholdfinance), but  has 
been true historically for both  cost and various  institutional reasons. 
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Throughout,  our  approach  to  applying  research  to  policy  development  is 
principally  one  of  “diagnose  and  treat.”  We  seek  to  develop  evidence  on  what 
might be failing in markets for savings products—whether  those failures are supply-
side,  demand-side,  and/or  policy-side—and  to  flesh out  the  implications  of  that 
evidence  for future research and policy. We  think this approach is  more justifiable, 
on ethical grounds,  than  a paternalistic presumption that  people should save more. 
It is also more likely to produce  cost-effective solutions  than  a “ready, fire, aim!” 
approach  to pursuing policy objectives that makes  strong (often  implicit) 
assumptions about  the  causes  of particular problems  and  the  best  ways to solve 
them.  With  this diagnose  and  treat  approach in mind,  we now dive into  our five 
classes of constraints/potential failures. 
 
 
 
2.1. Transaction Costs 
2. Constraints to Saving
 
Zero transaction costs is a critical assumption for generating  perfect markets, 
markets  that  maximize  social  welfare.  Accessing  and  using  formal  savings 
products involves monetary costs such as  account opening fees,  minimum balance 
requirements, withdrawal  fees, and transportation costs (time and money) to make 
transactions. Many policies  also  use  price  as  a  lever to  encourage more  savings. 
This  may  solve  a  problem,  but  indirectly  (which  one  can  reasonably  argue  is 
irrelevant, for  policy,  as  long  as  there  are  no  unintended consequences and  it  is 
cost-effective). For  example, we will later discuss time inconsistency  as potentially 
an underlying  mechanism behind undersaving. If a policymaker  or donor  wishes to 
match savings, thus providing  above-market returns  to the saver, they may increase 
savings to  what  would  be considered  optimal,  but  not  by directly  addressing the 
time  inconsistency  problem of  the  saver.  We  will discuss  the  evidence  on 
subsidized  programs as evidence on the transaction cost constraint, but  note  that 
in  these  cases  they  are  if  anything creating a  market distortion  with  respect to 
pricing, in order  to solve a separate problem. 
 
2.1.1. Pecuniary  Costs 
 
Monetary  costs  can  be  a  major  barrier for  accessing  and  using  formal 
financial  services,  especially  since  the  fees are  often  a  large  proportion of  poor 
people’s savings. These can be fixed costs like account opening  fees and  minimum 
balance requirements, or marginal costs such as transaction fees and  yields. 
Subsidizing  the  costs  of  opening  and  maintaining  bank  accounts  has  been 
shown  to  increase  the  take-up  of  formal  savings  accounts  and,  in  some  cases, 
savings balances.  A key study exploring  this in rural  Kenya  finds that  eliminating 
opening  costs  has  a  significant  positive  impact  on  the  take-up  of  bank  savings 
accounts  and  on  investment  levels  among  market-vending  micro-entrepreneurs 
(Dupas  and  Robinson,  2013a).  In  this  study  of  250  self-employed  individuals 
(market vendors  and  bicycle taxi drivers)  in a market area  in western  Kenya,  half 
were randomly selected for  the  offer  of a bank  savings account at  a village bank. 
The  research team  paid  the  account opening fee of  450 Ksh  (US$6.40)  for  each 
opened account  and gave each client the minimum balance of 100 Ksh (US$1.43), 
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which they were not allowed to withdraw  from the account.  Absent these subsidies 
the  account  had  an  effectively  negative  interest  rate  (due  to  fees  charged  on 
withdrawals). 
Of  the  156  treatment  group  individuals  given  the  opportunity  to  open  a 
savings account through this  intervention, 47 percent  opened  up  the  account and 
used  it  at least  once, with  41  percent of  the entire treatment  sample becoming 
“active” users, i.e.  making more than two deposits in  the first  six months (13 percent 
declined to open  an  account, and  another 40 percent  opened  an account but never 
made a deposit). Among the market vendors, the treatment  group increased  average 
daily investment in their businesses by 38–56 percent  and daily private expenditures 
by  37  percent  relative  to  the  comparison  group,  four  to  six months  after  the 
accounts  were offered. The intervention did not have any significant impact on the 
bicycle  taxi drivers. Given the small  sample and the short timeframe involved  in 
measuring impact in  this  study, it  serves  as  an  important illustration of  potential 
impacts but  requires  further scrutiny  with improved statistical power. In response to 
the promising  results from this study, replications  are currently underway in  Chile, 
Malawi, and  Uganda to  examine  whether relaxing the  opening fee constraint with 
a  larger  sample  and  across  varying  contexts has important positive  impacts  on 
formal savings account  take-up, usage, investment, expenditures, and  welfare. 
A similar field experiment  in Nepal  also finds strong  results from eliminating 
the  costs  of  opening formal savings  accounts among a  general  sample of  poor 
households (Prina, 2013). From a sample of 1118 households in 19 slum settlements, 
567 female household  heads were randomly chosen to receive the option  of opening 
basic  savings  accounts that did  not have  any  opening, maintenance, or withdrawal 
fees (for  a  sense  of  the  magnitude of  these  costs,  the  most  common  minimum 
balance  requirement across  the ten banks  with most  branches  in Nepal at the time 
of  the study was  Rs. 500  (US$7)). The account offered a  nominal interest  rate  of 
6% on  balances,  which  was lower  than  the  Nepalese  inflation  rate of over 10%. 
The  offer  of  the  bank  accounts  was  made  through  a  public  lottery  in  the  19 
communities. The  remaining  551 women  in the  sample  were not  offered  the free 
bank  account and formed  the comparison group. 
Eighty-four percent  of the households offered an account  opened  one, and  80 
percent  of  the  entire  treatment  sample  used  it  frequently  (making  at  least  two 
deposits over  a  one-year period). Access  to  these  free  savings  accounts allowed 
participant  households to  accumulate significantly  more  wealth,  increasing 
monetary assets  by 25 percent and total assets  by 12 percent for  households in the 
treatment group over  the  course  of  a  year,  without crowding  out  non-monetary 
assets such as livestock and  consumer  durables. Households that  were offered the 
bank  savings account  spent 20 percent  more on education and 15 percent  more on 
meat  and  fish, than the  comparison group. Households with  school-age  children 
spent  33–40 percent more  on  educational expenditures (which  includes  spending 
on school  fees, textbooks, school  uniforms, and  school  supplies).  The author also 
finds  that for  those  households that had been  hit  by  a  health shock in  the  past 
month,  those  in  the  treatment  group  maintained  a  higher  weekly  income  level 
compared to those in  the comparison group who suffered larger reductions in weekly 
income due to the recent health  shock. 
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The promising  results on downstream impacts  from the Dupas  and Robinson 
(2013a) and Prina  (2013) studies raise the question  of why take-up  and usage rates 
are  not even  higher, particularly  when  accounts are  subsidized. An  earlier field 
experiment  with  564  unbanked  households  (both  urban  and  rural)  in  Indonesia 
(Cole  et al.,  2011)  finds  that an  increase  in  the  subsidy offered to  open a  bank 
savings  account  from  $3  to  $14  significantly  increases  the  share  of  unbanked 
households that  open the account  nearly three-fold,  but from a low base: from 3.5 
to 12.7 percent.3 
In an evaluation  with a larger sample of 1565 unbanked individuals in Western 
Kenya, Dupas  et al. (2012) provides vouchers for subsidized savings accounts  to 55 
percent  of the sample through random assignment.  Take-up  was 62 percent  in the 
group that was  offered the  savings  account with  the  opening fee  and minimum 
balance paid for by the research team. However, only 18 percent of the group offered 
the  subsidized  account made  two  or  more  deposits within  a  year  of  opening the 
account. Schaner  (2013a) offers  large  subsidies  to  married couples  in Kenya  and 
finds that  only 7 percent of accounts  were used in their third year post-opening. 
The  lack  of  usage  could  of  course  be  due  to  heterogeneity in valuation 
(stemming from heterogeneity  in impacts), or to heterogeneity  in other constraints. 
For  example,  Dupas  et  al.  (2012)  finds  that  some  respondents  list  risk  of 
embezzlement, unreliable services,  and high ongoing transaction  fees  as concerns 
with formal banking. Schaner (2013c) finds heterogeneous responses to  reductions in 
transaction fees that may be driven by intra-household bargaining issues. 
Other  studies  examine  the  impacts  of  varying  marginal  yields  on  savings 
balances. Karlan and Zinman  (2013) is the only study we know of that  experiments 
with  a  range of  market, unsubsidized  rates. A  rural bank randomized  rates and 
account ownership requirements (individual, joint,  or  choice)  on  offers  of  a  new 
commitment  savings  product in  the  Philippines. The  bank made offers  to  9992 
individuals with  regular  income  streams  but  without an  existing account with  the 
bank.  Twenty-three percent of individuals  opened the account, and 9 percent used it 
(i.e.,  made  at  least  one  deposit  in  addition  to  the  opening  deposit)  over  the 
subsequent  20  months.  The  yield  and  ownership  requirements  did  not have 
significant  effects  on  savings  behavior, neither  in  the  full  sample  nor  in  sub-
groups that vary by wealth, prior  savings behavior, liquidity  constraints, etc.4 
The remaining  studies on savings yields introduce large, subsidized variation. 
Several U.S.-based studies find  statistically significant but often price-inelastic 
responses to  these  subsidies.5 The  one  LDC-setting study in this  vein (Schaner, 
 
 
3Offering a two-hour financial literacy training, on the other  hand, has a very modest  effect, and is 
less than half as cost-effective as the higher subsidies (Cole et al., 2011). 
4Kast et al. (2012) also  finds very small price  elasticity  with  respect  to  a change  in savings yield 
from  0.3 to  5 percent.  The  sample  frame  in that study  is current borrowers from  a microlender, with 
loans at about  45 percent APR, i.e., the change in savings yield is strictly inframarginal. Thus, this is the 
elasticity of savings for those simultaneously borrowing and saving. 
5In the U.S., Duflo et al. (2006) compares  a market rate  of return with 20 and 50 percent  matches 
in evaluating  take-up and  savings levels for  Individual Retirement Arrangement accounts; Mills et al. 
(2008) and Grinstein-Weiss  et al. (2012) compare  a market  rate to 100–200 percent (1:1 or 2:1 matches) 
in Individual Development Accounts;  Beshears et al. (2010b) looks at the effect of removing  employee 
contribution  matching  and  instead  introducing  a  fixed  employer  contribution  level  for  automatic 
enrolment savings plans. 
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2013a) compares  a market  rate, 0%, to 4%, 12%, and 20% annual  rates of return  on 
savings  in  a  field experiment in  Kenya. The incentives  were only  offered for a six-
month period.  This offer was only made  to couples  who said they were interested 
in opening bank accounts,  and each couple was offered the option  of opening up to 
three  bank  savings  accounts  (individual  account  for  the  husband, individual 
account for  the  wife, and  a joint  account). All participating households opened  at 
least  one  account. The  study  finds that accounts with  the  20% interest  rate  had  a 
significantly higher probability of usage (i.e., making at least one transaction in the 
account during  the six months  following treatment) of 8.6 percentage  points  (12.6 
vs. 4 percent). In terms of price-elasticity, the study finds that a 0% interest rate has 
4  percent usage,  a  4%  interest rate results in  5.5  percent usage  (not statistically 
significant),  and  a 12% rate  results  in 8.9 percent  usage  (a statistically significant 
increase). 
The  most  striking  finding  in  Schaner  (2013a),  and  arguably  in  any  of  the 
“impacts”  studies, is that the highest subsidy produces  dramatic  long-term  impacts 
on income. Despite the fact that  all subsidies were short-term, respondents in the 
20% arm report  $15 higher monthly  income than  the 0% comparison group,  in the 
long-term. Thus  two  and  a half  years  after  the  six-month subsidized  interest  rate 
intervention  was  withdrawn,  participants  in the highest-subsidy group report 
income  that is  22  percent  higher  than the  comparison  group, and  orders  of 
magnitude  higher  than the  subsidy  amount,  which  totaled less  than $1  for  95 
percent of  recipients.  The  author explores  the  mechanism  underlying  this  result 
and  infers  that  the  high  subsidy  increased  the  salience  of saving,  leading  to 
improved  (mental) accounting and  improved  entrepreneurship that  produced the 
higher  income.  The results  of  this  study,  while promising,  do  arise  in  a  context 
where each household was offered multiple bank accounts, and we do not have any 
way of inferring  how price-elasticity  measurements would  differ if each household 
only  had  the  opportunity to  open  a  single  account.  Future  research  that  tests 
whether the  long-run result  replicates,  and  that  further unpacks  the  mechanism(s) 
driving the results, is critical. 
Another fruitful line  of  inquiry for  future work is mapping demand curves for 
savings and savings products.  We  suspect that price sensitivity to savings yields is 
likely to contain the sorts  of non-linearities found  by Chetty  (2012) with respect to 
tax rates and labor supply: at low  yields  and/or low  balances, the dollar implications 
of  yield  variation is  too miniscule  to  merit attention,  but at some  point on  the 
demand curve the  stakes  become  big enough, and price sensitivity  kicks in. 
 
 
 
2.1.2. Non-Pecuniary Costs 
 
The non-monetary costs associated  with formal  banking  can be large enough 
to discourage  poor  households  from using formal savings services. These costs can 
be difficult to quantify.  Researchers  have studied how these costs are reduced using 
(quasi-)experimental variation in  the  presence  of  banks (thus  reducing  the  travel 
and opportunity  costs  in  terms of  time  and foregone wages),  in  “on-ramping” 
(facilitating  the administrative process of opening an account), and in introducing 
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new products  and technologies that change the way people access and interact  with 
banks. 
Randomizing bank  branch expansion  to  estimate  impact  on  savings take-up 
and  welfare  impact  can  be difficult  or  unfeasible  in many  areas.  Two  non-
experimental  approaches  are  noteworthy,  one  better-identified  (India)  than  the 
other  (Mexico).  In  India, Burgess  and  Pande  (2005)  studies  an  exogenous 
expansion of bank  branches  between  1977 and  1990 from  a change  in regulation 
that  led to an increase in both credit and savings delivery to underserved areas, and 
identifies measurable   macroeconomic  impacts on poverty reduction  from the 
expansion of financial services (both credit and savings). Aportela (1999), in Mexico, 
finds  that an  expansion of  a  government postal savings  bank leads  to lower levels 
of poverty. 
Due  to  the  difficulty  of  large-scale  randomized  studies  on  full  banking 
services,  as  an alternative some  evaluations have  estimated the impact of  making 
some  features of  banks more  easily  available. Flory (2011) takes  advantage of  a 
natural field experiment in Malawi  to study  the effect of bringing  banks  closer to 
geographically  secluded populations, through the introduction of a fully-equipped 
mobile  van  “bank  on  wheels,”  which  also  included  an  information  campaign 
randomized at  the  community level to  increase  formal  savings.  A two-year  panel 
dataset containing 2006 households was collected in the pre-harvest season. Take-up 
rates for bank  accounts  were still low despite the intervention, increasing from 9.3 
to 12.4 percent  across all treated  areas  (33 percent  increase), and  from 8.6 to 12.3 
percent (43  percent increase) in  treated areas that were  three or more  kilometers 
away  from  the  “bank-on-wheels”  stop.  No  downstream  impacts  on  the  “new 
savers” were measured in this panel survey. 
In the Philippines, Ashraf et  al.  (2006b)  studies the randomized  offer  of  a 
deposit  collection  service to micro-savers  of a rural  bank.  The product had  a cost 
of four pesos (about  10 cents U.S.) per visit, which could be monthly  or bi-weekly. 
The service had a take-up  rate of 28 percent among those clients who were reached 
by  the  marketing team  and  offered  the  service,  and  14.2  percent  of  the  full 
treatment  sample  regularly  used  the  service (i.e., half  of  those  who  opened  the 
account). Interestingly, while present-bias could  be one of the  reasons  that  clients 
elected  to  pay  for  the  service (hoping  that  it  would  act  as  a  soft  commitment 
device  from  the  pressure  of  having  the  deposit  collector  come  to  get  one’s 
savings at one’s door-step), the data did not show time-inconsistent discounting  as 
a significant  correlate of  take-up. Distance, however, was  a  very  strong correlate: 
the probability  of take-up was 6 percentage  points  higher  for  each  additional 10 
kilometers  between the  client’s home  and  a  bank  branch. For the  entire  sample, 
being in a neighborhood  where  the  deposit  collector  service was offered  implied 
an  increase  of  up  to  40  percent  in  savings  stock  compared  to  clients  in 
comparison neighborhoods.6 
Schaner  (2013c)  in  Kenya also  finds  significant  increases  in  savings 
transactions  from  expanded geographic access, via cards  that access an  ATM  
 
6Preliminary results  from  an  ongoing study  by  McConnell (2012)  with  1601  market vendors in 
Ghana, comparing the relative importance of convenience  and information in increasing  the adoption 
of  formal bank savings  accounts, also  indicate that individuals seem  to  be  more likely  to  open an 
account when they can open the account directly at their place of business, pointing  to the importance 
of convenience as a deciding factor  in financial decisions. 
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network, though in this case it is unclear whether  pecuniary or  non-pecuniary cost 
reductions  drive  the  result  because  the  ATM cards  reduced marginal transaction 
fees  substantially  as  well.  Future  work  that  simultaneously  and  independently 
randomizes pecuniary and  non-pecuniary costs would be very informative. 
 
 
2.2. Lack  of Trust  and Regulatory  Barriers 
 
Trust  also may explain some shortfalls  in the relationship between savers and 
formal financial  institutions. Trust affects  the  willingness  of  individuals to  use  a 
particular  financial  institution  based  on  their  subjective  assessment  of  its 
reliability.  Regulatory  barriers, often  defended as  enhancing overall  trust in  an 
institution,  frequently  include  requirements such as “know  your  customer” rules, 
which  can  hinder participation  in  the  banking  system  for  the  poor.  Trust  thus 
affects relationships between regulators and financial institutions as well. 
 
 
2.2.1. Low Consumer Trust  and  Confidence 
 
In any economic  transaction, one party’s lack of trust  in the other  acts as an 
implicit cost due to moral hazard  and either increases monitoring and enforcement 
costs, or leads to unconsummated transactions. 
Guiso  et  al.  (2004)  measures  how  trust  and  the  development  of  financial 
markets are  related in Italy  using  a  large  panel  survey,  and  finds that low-social-
capital provinces  use  fewer  checks  and  hold  more  cash.  Similarly,  Coupé (2011) 
looks at representative survey data  from the FINREP Ukraine survey, and reports 
that  more than  half of the sample save in cash at home, with those who self-report 
as having low trust  in banks  being 10–15 percentage  points  more likely to keep all 
their savings in cash. 
Dupas  et  al.  (2012)  in  western  Kenya,  with  a  sample  of  1565  unbanked 
individuals, finds reasonable take-up (62  percent) but lower active usage (18 percent) 
of  free  savings  accounts.  A  qualitative survey  on  a  subset  of  study  participants, 
finds that  low trust  in the bank  is often cited as a key concern that  deters people in 
their sample from using formal bank  accounts.  As many as 15–37 percent of  those 
who  did  not  open  or  use  the  free  savings  account  with  one  of  the  two 
participating banks cited  unreliability as  a  concern, and  7–24 percent  mentioned 
risk  of embezzlement  by the  given bank  as a concern. In  contrast, Djankov et al. 
(2008) reports  on a survey of 4765 Mexican  banked  and unbanked households, of 
whom  2182 households did  not  have  a  bank account. When  asked  to  pick  their 
main  reason  for not  having  a bank  account from  a list of options, only 2 percent 
of  the unbanked  sample  mentioned not  having confidence  in  the institution  as 
opposed to 89 percent  who stated  they did not  have enough  money and  6 percent 
who said that they did not  want  an account. 
There is  a  sizeable  behavioral economics literature that varies  trust 
experimentally  in  lab  settings,  in  order  to,  for  example,  evaluate  the  impact  of 
trust  on  risk-taking  (see Karlan, 2005; Schechter,  2007). But  to  our  knowledge, 
there are no randomized field evaluations that directly  tackle  the issue of low trust 
in  formal  banking  services  as  a  barrier  to  saving.  The  challenge,  from  an 
experimental perspective, is  clear: one cannot easily  randomly assign trust. One  
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could,  for  example,  randomize  the  marketing  of  a  bank,  in  which  some 
advertisements focus on why the bank should be trusted. We are unaware  of studies 
that have done this directly. 
While  many  factors can  be  expected  to  affect  consumer trust in  a  financial 
institution—reputation,  brand,  product  quality,  price, etc.—governments are 
thought  to play a central role in building and maintaining  client trust in all formal 
financial institutions  and in facilitating contractual  exchanges between  strangers 
who  are  not bound by pre-existing  social  ties or  reciprocal norms (La Porta et al., 
2002). Through prudential regulation, central banks aim  to  assure investors that a 
country’s  retail  banks  and  other  regulated  financial  institutions  will  honor  their 
deposits. Such prudential  regulation has two basic goals: to protect small  depositors 
in  particular  from losing their savings, and to ensure trust in the financial system as 
a whole and preserve the stability of the economy (Conroy, 2000). 
Banking  institutions fall  into  two  main  regulatory categories: those  granted 
full banking  licenses, i.e. allowed to accept deposits from clients and on-lend funds, 
and those with  a  non-banking  financial  institution  license  (often covering  most 
microfinance institutions)  that allows  them to  lend  to  clients  but restricts them 
from  accepting  deposits  and/or  from  on-lending  funds.  The former  are  always 
regulated by the central  bank  while the latter  institutions are sometimes  overseen 
by  a  separate regulator and subject to less oversight given  their limited scope. Small 
banks  may  also  escape  some  regulatory  scrutiny,  given  lack  of  systemic 
importance, and  the  difficulties of  monitoring compliance forensically  with  data 
(Christen and Rosenberg, 2000; Conroy, 2000). 
There  appears  to  be  a  general  tension  between  prudential  regulation  and 
access/outreach objectives: the bigger institutions are easier to regulate with limited 
resources, but limiting  the  ability of  smaller institutions  to  offer  saving products 
presumably forgoes  some  access and  innovation. The  recent  policy  discourse  on 
“proportional” regulation might offer a way out, but that  notion  is still very vague 
and needs  to  find actionable guidelines. This  is clearly  an  area that deserves more 
systematic  inquiry  and  experimentation to  identify  the  most  promising ways to 
improve consumer confidence and trust in the formal banking system. 
 
 
2.2.2. Regulatory Barriers 
 
Casual  empiricism suggests that  strict  regulation in monitoring bank  account 
ownership  and  transactions  serves  as  a  key  barrier  to  entry  for  the  poor. 
Accountability on  flows  of  even  small  denominations  of  value  has  become  all 
the  more salient since  restrictive Anti-Money Laundering  (AML) laws  have been 
put  in  place  to  detect  movements  of  money  that  might  be  related  to  terrorist 
activities (FATF, 2013). 
Such  prudential  regulation imposes additional  transaction  costs  for banks 
and customers.  One impediment to the expansion of small-balance savings accounts 
that  has been identified in a few settings is the due diligence requirement on  these 
accounts (Ivatury and  Mas,  2008; Jentzsch, 2009). These  requirements, also known 
as  “Know Your Customer” (KYC) rules, stipulate that regulated institutions ask 
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for specific  identification documents (including proof of  name,  date  of  birth, 
national identity  number, and  residential  address),  collect  predetermined 
information  about clients, and monitor account activities, all  of  which  dissuade 
small  savers—particularly poor  individuals  with  few formal  documents—  from 
getting an account. 
KYC  rules  present  several  potential  barriers  to  savings  mobilization.  The 
identification  document  requirement  can  be  a  big  hurdle  in  countries  that  lack 
comprehensive identity  registries.7 Waiting  periods  (often  24–48 hours)  needed  to 
process KYC  requirements in some countries  can serve as an entry barrier  in their 
own right, and may also lead to account  activation at times when clients are not in 
the presence of a banking  agent (who could, for instance, give them a basic tutorial 
on account  usage). Banking models that use third-party correspondent agents have 
highlighted  the  need  for  new methods  to  screen  clients  that  are  low-cost, 
standardized,  and compliant with regulation (Bankable Frontier,  2009;  Jentzsch, 
2009; CGAP, 2010).  Typically, these  new  systems  try  to use  some  form of 
biometric identification to  fulfill KYC rules  (fingerprints or  iris scans).8 There  has 
not  yet  been  a  rigorous  evaluation on the  impact of  these  changes on savings 
account take-up, outreach, and/or bank  risk exposure. 
In  the  one  field  experiment  conducted  on  KYC  issues,  Chin  et  al.  (2011) 
examines the impact  of overcoming  a regulatory barrier  to saving among  Mexican 
immigrants  in  the  U.S.  From  a  sample  of  184  Mexican  immigrants, 99  were 
randomly chosen  to  receive  assistance and a  fee  waiver  (of  US$27)  to  obtain a 
formal  identification card,  which is useful in enabling  undocumented immigrants 
to open a bank  savings account. They find that  those in the treatment group  were 
38 percentage points more likely  to have increased their savings  over the five-month 
period following the intervention. They also find that  those in the treatment group 
saved  9 percentage points  more  and  decreased  their  remittances to  Mexico as  a 
share  of income  by 6 percentage points relative  to those  in the comparison group. 
The results were heterogeneous, varying based on the self-reported level of control 
the  migrants claimed  to  have  over  the  spending of  their remittances in Mexico, 
which  we discuss in Section  2.4.1. Future research  would  do  well to  test whether 
these  results  replicate, and if  so  how  much  of  the  effects  are  driven  by KYC 
requirements vs. price. 
 
2.3. Information  and Knowledge Gaps 
 
Lack  of  information—e.g.,  low  “financial  literacy”—is  often  cited  as  a 
(potential) cause of undersaving.  Policy and programmatic  efforts that attempt to 
increase  financial  literacy  in order  to  increase  saving  are  built  on  three  key 
assumptions,  which we consider  in turn:  (1) knowledge  is low (evidence says yes); 
(2)  low  knowledge causes  undersaving (evidence  says  maybe);  and (3) 
interventions can increase knowledge,  cost-effectively (evidence says no, not  with  
 
7UNICEF  statistics indicate that “the ratio of children (below the age of five) who are not registered 
ranges  from  10% of all births  in Latin  America  to  59% in South  Asia,  and  a stunning  66% in Sub-
Saharan Africa”  (Jentzsch,  2009). 
8KYC problems that apply to credit markets have a more direct benefit in reducing moral hazard—see 
Giné  et  al.  (2012)  for  the  impact of  introducing  fingerprint identification on  loan  repayments  and 
defaults  in Malawi. 
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what  is currently being  tried).  We will discuss each  of these  in turn, but  we also 
lead  the  reader  to Fernandes et al. (2013) for  a  more  thorough meta-analysis of 
168 papers, which concludes that financial education  as typically implemented  does 
not lead to substantial behavior change. 
Is basic financial knowledge  low? Mounting evidence suggests “yes.” Recent 
surveys find  that a significant share of  the  population  in  both developed and 
developing countries lacks  basic financial knowledge.9  In India for instance,  26 
percent  of  respondents  provided  no  correct  answers  to  four  questions  on  basic 
financial principles in a recent survey, and only 3  percent answered all four  questions 
correctly  (Cole  et  al.,  2011).  The  same  instrument  tested  in  other  LDCs  finds 
similar low levels of basic financial literacy (see Xu and Zia, 2012).10 
Does low knowledge cause  undersaving? Theoretically/conceptually speaking, 
the link is  tenuous and nuanced. In many economic models competition, learning, 
delegation, and/or mean-zero errors will  attenuate  or eliminate any effect  of  low 
knowledge on undersaving.  The  point  about  mean-zero  errors  is  particularly 
important, subtle,  and  often  overlooked in discussions  about the  role of  financial 
literacy. Even  if competition, learning, and delegation fail,  we still need to be clear 
about how low knowledge could produce undersaving, as opposed to oversaving, or 
to multiple errors that cancel each other out and produce optimal  saving on average 
(at  least  at  the  aggregate  level, but  perhaps  at the  individual level as  well if the 
lack  of knowledge leads  me to  oversave  sometimes and  undersave at  other times). 
There  are  several  ways  in  which  low  financial literacy  could  be associated with 
undersaving. One  is truly  just  an  association, not  causation: low literacy  may be 
correlated  with  psychological/cognitive  biases  that  actually  drive  undersaving  (we 
consider  such  “behavioral”  biases  in  Section  2.5).  Other  mechanisms  could 
actually be  causal.  There  may  be  “low-knowledge traps” where the uninformed 
rely on social learning and end up herding on sub-optimal choices (Banerjee,  1992). 
When  savings  returns are  risky  (including risk  of  fraud), low-knowledge people 
may  opt-out of the  market (Calvet et al., 2007). 
Empirically  speaking,  the    causal    link    between    low    knowledge  and 
undersaving looks  increasingly  weak,  despite  evidence from  household surveys in 
more-developed countries of strong  correlations (Hastings et al., 2012). However, a 
high correlation between  financial  illiteracy  and  low savings does not  necessarily 
imply causality; for example, mounting evidence suggests that  financial literacy is 
 
9In  a  2009  study  in  the  U.S.,  less  than  half  of  the  people  surveyed  could  answer  five  simple 
financial  questions correctly, with  women  displaying significantly  worse  financial  literacy than men 
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009).  In earlier publications,  the same authors have shown that financial literacy 
is especially poor for  those  in low-income and low-education groups and among minorities (Lusardi and 
Mitchell,  2007) and  that fewer than 31 percent  of  women  over  50 years  of  age reported ever having 
attempted any  retirement  planning  calculations  (Lusardi  and  Mitchell,  2008). According  to a  2009 
survey,  only  one-third of  respondents in the  U.S.  could  apply  concepts  of  interest  compounding or 
understand the workings  of credit cards (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). 
10The validity of different instruments that try to measure financial literacy needs to be debated  and 
questioned. The set of four questions  used in Cole et al. (2011) and elsewhere (drawn  from Lusardi  and 
Mitchell,  2006) to measure  the understanding of compound interest,  inflation,  and  risk diversification 
is helpful  in as far as it draws  our  attention to the substantial share  of people  answering  these basic 
questions incorrectly. 
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correlated with important variables  that  are often  omitted  due to data  constraints 
(Fernandes  et  al.,  2013).11    Reverse  causality  is  also  a  concern,  where  saving 
increases knowledge  rather than the other  way around. 
Say we grant that financial literacy is important, despite the lack of convincing 
evidence  that  literacy  per  se  affects  downstream  behaviors  like  saving.  Which 
interventions  increase  literacy  (and  saving)?  And  are  the  interventions  cost-
effective? The evidence on these questions is not  very encouraging. 
Interventions  designed  to  improve financial  literacy are  typically 
programmatic. They range in duration  from an hour or less,  to several weeks. They 
are delivered in  settings ranging from bank branches to classrooms. Most are group-
based.  We  distinguish  literacy  programs  from  programs  or  services  that  offer 
advice,  because  we  think  there  is  a  meaningful  distinction  between  teaching 
someone  how  manage  their  finances—primarily by imparting facts  and  concepts, 
as literacy programs  seek to do—and  telling someone how to manage their finances 
(as  advice/counseling services tend  to  do).  We also  distinguish between programs 
that focus on personal/household finances, and those that focus on microenterprises. 
We focus on the former  but  draw some selected insights from the latter.12  We focus 
on studies from developing country settings, and  note that the Fernandes  et  al. 
(2013)  meta-analysis of financial literacy interventions, which includes studies from 
both DCs and LDCs, concludes that interventions  have small if any effects  and are 
unlikely to pass a cost–benefit test. 
In  an  early comparison of price versus information as a barrier to  saving in 
Indonesia, Cole et al. (2011) offers a free two-hour financial  education program on 
the workings and benefits of bank accounts.  The study reports  that  77 percent of 
individuals agreed to participate  in the experiment. However, the intervention has 
no  effect  on  the  probability  of  opening a  bank savings  account for the general 
population, although  there are modest  increases in take-up among those with  low 
initial levels of  financial  literacy or  low  levels of  education.  The study  does not 
measure  intermediate knowledge  outcomes. In contrast, modest financial  subsidies 
have much  larger  effects, inducing a nearly  three-fold increase  in take-up. 
In a subsequent  study, Carpena et al. (2011) uses a randomized experiment  to 
measure  the  effect  of  financial  training in  western  India on  three  distinct 
dimensions of financial knowledge:  numeracy skills, basic financial awareness,  and 
attitudes toward financial decisions. Among  1200 urban households in Ahmedabad, 
two-thirds were  randomly assigned  to  a  video-based financial education  program 
offered  at  a  training    center  once  a  week  (two–three    hours  per  session) for  five 
weeks,  the remaining third served as a comparison  group and received a 
 
 
11For example, Cole  et al.  (2012)  finds  that although an  extra year  of  schooling leads  to  a  7–8 
percentage  point  increase in the likelihood  of financial participation, this is due to enhanced cognitive 
ability  rather than any  specific financial  literacy  education as  previously inferred by  Bernheim et  al. 
(2001). 
12For  evaluations of entrepreneurship training  programs, see Karlan and  Valdivia (2011) on Peru; 
Giné and Mansuri (2011) on Pakistan; Bruhn  and  Zia (2011) on Bosnia and  Herzegovina; Fairlie  et al. 
(2013) on the U.S.; Bruhn  et al. (2012) on a consulting  program in Mexico; and Drexler et al. (2013) on 
a simplified heuristics-based program in the Dominican Republic. 
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video-based  health  training  program  delivered  in  the  same  manner,  and  all 
households  received a test  a few weeks later. To  enhance motivation for  learning, 
the researchers added a pay-for-performance treatment. Attendance  figures  at the 
sessions are not  reported in the paper.  The study finds that  financial education has 
limited effects in increasing financial numeracy  even in the cases where individuals 
were provided with monetary incentives.  On the other hand, financial education did 
influence  participants’ awareness  and  attitudes toward financial  products and the 
financial planning tools available to them, with basic financial awareness increasing 
by  7.7  percentage  points  relative  to  the  comparison  group.  Subsequent  bank 
account take-up and  usage were not  measured in this study. 
In another study in western India,  Field et al. (2010) finds that  giving financial 
literacy  training to women  working  in the informal  sector  has no impact  on their 
probability of saving. The program involved running  two-day  training  sessions on 
financial  literacy,  business  skills,  and  aspirations  for  bank  customers  in 
partnership  with  SEWA  (Self Employed  Women’s  Association). They  selected  a 
random  sample  of  636  women  from  SEWA’s  customer  base  and  randomly 
assigned  two-thirds to be  invited to training sessions. The study reports that more 
than  70 percent  of  those  invited  attended  the  training.  When  597 of  the  initial 
sample  were successfully  surveyed at follow-up, they  found that training  did not 
increase savings,  and only  raised  borrowing and business  income  among a  sub-
group of  women  who  faced  strict  social  constraints. The  study  did  not  measure 
intermediate knowledge  outcomes. 
Seshan  and  Yang  (2013) measures  the  influence of savings-focused financial 
literacy training  on the financial decisions of Indian  migrant  workers in Qatar  and 
their wives who were still based in India.  The sample for this study comprised  232 
married, male  Indian migrant workers  based  in  Doha, Qatar, of  whom  157 were 
randomly offered  a  short financial  literacy  training (a  three-hour  workshop 
followed  by a  two-hour dinner)  focused  on  creating  and  executing  household 
savings plans. The other  75 workers  were not offered the training. Of those invited, 
47.6 percent  attended  the  training.  The  study  does  not  measure  knowledge 
outcomes, but finds indications  of behavior  change, with migrants  who received an 
invitation  being  48.4 percent  more  likely  to  self-report  jointly  making  financial 
decisions  with  their  wives. Impacts  are  heterogeneous  by  baseline  savings  levels 
(strong effects for those with low savings levels at baseline). 
Despite  the mixed (at best) impacts  of financial literacy  programs on literacy 
and downstream behaviors,  and truly scant evidence on whether such interventions 
change  (much  less  improve)  savings  decisions,  we  nevertheless  draw  several 
glimmers of hope/insight for rethinking approaches going forward. First, it has been 
difficult thus  far  to  disentangle the  (in)effectiveness of the  treatments  themselves 
from  the  often  low take-up of the  treatments (many  studies  so far  offer  explicit 
incentives  or  compensation—cash payments, dinner,  etc.—to  boost  participation 
rates). Behavioral biases could lead consumers to undervalue  financial education,  so 
going  forward  estimating  treatment-on-the-treated  effects  and  determinants  of 
take-up decisions  would be  fruitful. Second, several  of  the  existing  studies  find 
heterogeneous  effects, suggesting the importance of targeting to match content with 
recipients. Third, and closely related, there has been relatively little focus thus far on 
youth, and we know of at least three in-progress evaluations  of class-based financial 
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education programs for children  and  youth with promising preliminary results.13 
Fourth, it may be the case that  less is more when it comes to imparting knowledge, 
at least to adults.  Two of the more promising  sets of results—Drexler et al. (2013) 
and Seshan and Yang (2013)—come from programs that  are either very simple (in 
terms of content)  or short  (in terms of total  time commitment) and focused tightly 
on  particular  behaviors.  Fifth,  and  closely  related,  we  share  Fernandes  et  al.’s 
(2013) view that  “just in time” information interventions (e.g., those that are linked 
to financial product  take-up  or other “teachable  moments”)  remain promising;  see, 
for example, Song’s (2013) study described in Section 2.5.3. Sixth, and again closely 
related,  we emphasize that  informational interventions need not be programmatic, 
particularly if it  turns out to  be  true  that the  timing,  specificity,  and  framing of 
content  are more important than  its comprehensiveness. 
Two U.S. studies suggest that social learning can have a strong effect on savings 
behavior (Duflo  and  Saez,  2003;  Beshears  et  al.,  2012),  and  we  suspect  that 
literatures on social networks  are generating  insights on how to best-harness  such 
effects. Similarly,  Berg and  Zia  (2013) randomly  offers  middle- and  low-income 
viewers in South Africa monetary incentives to watch one of  two soap operas airing 
on  overlapping  time slots,  one  of  which  embeds  exemplars  of  responsible  and 
irresponsible financial  behaviors  while the  other  does  not  modify  content  along 
these  lines.  While  the  study  finds no  effect  on  general  financial  literacy,  the 
treatment group scored  4.5  percentage  points  higher  on  average  on  questions 
related to  financial issues  that were  specifically  addressed in the soap opera. Those 
in  the  group  encouraged  to  watch  the  soap  opera  with  the  “exemplar”  financial 
behaviors content  were 69 percent  more  likely to  borrow  primarily  from  formal 
institutions. They  were also  less likely to  have  recently  financed  a durable  using 
expensive credit (by 23 percent)  and  less likely to  have  gambled  (by 17 percent). 
There are also many efforts underway  to “game-ify” the delivery of basic financial 
concepts, although  we are unaware  of any evaluations  with citable results as of yet. 
Finally,  interest in the more traditional approaches  to social marketing  and point-
of-sale    disclosure  remains  strong,  although  evidence  on  their  effectiveness  is 
limited. 
 
2.4. Social Constraints 
 
Historically,  the  dominant  mechanism  for  individuals  and  households    to 
smooth consumption  and respond to shocks has been to turn to the financial support 
offered by family and kin networks.  These links are often informal,  in that they are 
neither  regulated nor  enforced by any third-party institution. However, social ties 
and norms  can foster risk-sharing within- and  across-households. 
Social  links  and  obligations can  be enabling  and/or constricting, and  various 
studies  have  found evidence  of  both dynamics  among the  poor. Intra-household 
barriers to saving may be relevant if  members of a household have different spending 
preferences and a lack of ability to commit to consumption/savings plans  
 
13For details  on  these  recent  evaluations of  child  and youth financial  literacy  interventions,  see 
“Starting a Lifetime of Saving: Teaching  the Practice  of Saving to Ugandan Youth” (study description 
at  http://poverty-action.org/project/0113); “Evaluating  the  Efficacy  of  School  Based  Financial 
Education  Programs”  in  Ghana  (study  description  at  http://poverty-action.org/project/0465);  and 
“Financial Literacy and Behavior Formation:  Large Scale  Experimental  Evidence from Brazil” (Bruhn 
et al., 2013). 
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(the  lack  of  commitment  is  a  contracting  friction/failure    that  prevents  intra-
household bargaining from  producing efficient outcomes). Inter-household barriers 
to saving may also be relevant if social norms necessitate that an individual provide 
support to friends and relatives if she is asked and has the cash on hand. 
 
 
2.4.1. Intra-Household Bargaining and  Sharing 
 
Variations in the preferences of the male and female heads of a household  can 
have  large  effects  on  savings  and  investment behaviors, with  important 
implications  for savings product design. Furthermore, if the woman  lacks relative 
power in  the household,  she  may not have agency over her own decisions, and this 
may also have ramifications for savings  that could benefit the children (if the women 
have  child-centered  preferences,  more  so  than  the  men).  In  an  early  non-
experimental study  in Kenya, Anderson and Baland (2002) finds that the  probability 
of participation in a Rotating Saving  and Credit Association (ROSCA) follows an 
inverted-U relationship with  a woman’s  bargaining position  within  the household 
(where  bargaining power  is  proxied by  income  share).  This  reinforces  earlier 
hypotheses that  the observed  widespread participation in informal  savings clubs is 
in part  a response  to  intra-household bargaining difficulties (Besley et al., 1993). 
Hertzberg (2012) also presents  some recent and related  theory. 
We  know  of  three  papers that directly  tackle  the  empirical  question of  how 
intra-household  preference  heterogeneity  affects  household  savings  rates  and 
investment  behavior.  Among  142  couples  in  Kenya,  Robinson  (2012)  randomly 
gives either  a husband or wife a small positive,  public,  income  shock  once a week 
for eight weeks; i.e., the husband and  wife each had  a 50 percent  chance  of being 
chosen  each  week.  Husbands increase  their  expenditures on  privately consumed 
goods  in the  weeks after  they  receive a positive  income  shock,  but  not  in weeks 
when their wives receive the additional income. In contrast, there is no significant 
increase  in  the  expenditures of  women  when  they  or  their husbands receive  the 
shock,  suggesting  that  women  save  all  of  the additional  income.  In  a  separate 
experiment with married  couples  in Kenya,  Schaner  (2013b) finds that  household 
saving is increasing  in how  associatively-matched couples  are on  their  individual 
discount  rates.  Specifically,  well-matched couples are  more likely  to  use 
experimentally offered  and  subsidized  joint  accounts, and  they respond much  more 
to variation in rates of return.  Ashraf  (2009), in another lab experiment  in the field 
in the  Philippines,  randomizes the  allotment of  a  sum  of  money  equivalent  to  a 
day’s wage to existing or previous  clients of a bank, either  in public  or in private. 
The study finds  men and women whose spouses make the savings decision in the 
household  to  be  more  likely  to  deposit  the  money  into  their  own  account  in  the 
private  condition, and commit  it to consumption in the public condition. 
Several  other  experiments  find evidence  that  intra-household  preference 
heterogeneity  produces  demand  for  commitment.  In  another arm of  her  study, 
Schaner (2013c)  finds  that responses to  reductions in  transaction  cost  vary 
substantially with  the  gender of  the  account-holder.  Reducing transaction  costs 
by half  (through the  offer  of  ATM cards) significantly  improves long-run account 
usage by 62 percent (the intervention produces  a 45 percent increase in the number 
of deposits  and a doubling of the number of withdrawals in the first six months). 
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This positive impact  is, however, concentrated in individual  accounts  held by men 
and  in accounts jointly  held  by men  and  women,  with  an  insignificant,  negative-
signed effect on accounts  individually  held by women. Additional findings suggest 
that bargaining power asymmetry is a key mechanism. 
Ashraf  et  al.’s  (2010)  follow-up  on  the  long-run effects  of  offering  a 
commitment  savings  account (SEED)  in  the  Philippines  finds  that  the  women 
offered  the  account increased  their  scores  on  an  index  of  household decision-
making by  0.14 standard  deviations over  the  comparison  group. Heterogeneous 
impacts by bargaining power were important,  with a significant increase in female-
oriented  durable  goods  purchased    in  households    where  the  women  had  below-
median decision-making power at baseline (by 1457 Ph pesos). 
Bargaining over  financial  decisions  can  be magnified  in migrant households, 
where decision-makers face higher costs of sharing information.  Ashraf et al. (2011) 
varies  the  degree  of  control over  remittances by  an emigrant household member, 
and  measures  the  impact  of  how  the  remitted funds  are  expended  in  the home 
location.  A sample of 898 Salvadorian migrants  in the Washington DC area were 
visited at home and advised to remit money into savings  accounts in  El Salvador, 
with random  assignment  to individual  and/or  joint accounts  in the home country. 
Over a six-month  period, the study finds higher take-up  (by 21.7 percentage points) 
and  higher  savings in the  project  accounts (by $211) among  emigrants given the 
greatest  control over  remitted funds.  After  a year,  total savings among households  
in which the remitter  expressed demand  for control  at baseline increased by  $2024 
or 216 percent among those in  the group offered the joint account  and the individual 
account  for  the  remitter,  vs.  the  comparison  group  that  was  not  offered  any 
account ($2962 vs. $938 in total  savings, respectively). 
Chin et al. (2011) finds very similar results for Mexican  emigrants  in the U.S. 
from  the  randomized allotment of  ID  cards  to  Hispanic individuals living in  the 
U.S., which is  a requirement  to open a formal savings account.  Participants self-
reported at baseline on their level of control over the spending  of their  remittances 
in  Mexico.  The  intervention  improved  migrants’  likelihood  of  opening  a  bank 
account in the U.S. by 38 percentage points, increased  their U.S. savings as a share 
of  income by  9  percentage points, and decreased their remittances to Mexico as a 
share of income by 6 percentage  points.  Impacts  were largest for those reporting no 
control over the use of the remittances in Mexico at baseline.14 
 
 
2.4.2. Inter-Household Bargaining and  Sharing 
 
Family  and  community  networks  are  important  sources  of  risk-sharing  in 
developing  (and  other)  countries  (see  Robinson,  2012  for  a  review).  The 
implications of these networks  for savings behavior  and optimal  savings rates are 
complex;  for  example,  well-functioning risk-sharing reduces  the  need  for 
precautionary saving. 
 
14In  a lab  experiment in the  field in Mozambique, Batista et al. (2013) finds that when  randomly 
offered the  option of  making cash  or  in-kind gifts  to  close  peers  (outside the  family)  in  a  repeated 
dictator game, the choice of making  in-kind gifts accounted for 42.6 percent of all giving and increased 
total  giving by 5.5 percentage   points.   The  demand   for  “other-control” seems to  exist even inter-
household. 
 
 
© 2014 UNU-WIDER. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf 
of International Association for Research in Income  and Wealth
 53 
Review of Income  and Wealth,  Series 60, Number 1, March 2014 
 
 
We  are  particularly  interested  in questions  of  whether  and  how  savings 
behavior responds to social claimants  (Platteau,  2000). There is ample descriptive 
evidence—much of it from anthropology, but increasingly from economics as well, 
as  discussed  below—that  wealthier  households  are  indeed  pressured  to  support 
less-well-to-do people in their networks.  But the links from this pressure  to saving 
behavior are not  well-established.  Do  claimants  act as a tax on household savings 
and  wealth  accumulation?  Do  commitment  devices  and  concealment  mute  the 
depressive effects of any tax, and at what  cost? 
In a  non-experimental survey  of  credit cooperatives in  Cameroon,  Baland et 
al.  (2011)  finds  that  19.1  percent  of  all  members  take  out  loans  that  are  fully 
collateralized by liquid savings held in the same financial institutions, and  end up 
paying a penalty  that  is equivalent  to a 24% interest  rate due to this simultaneous 
saving  and borrowing behavior. Ethnographic  work  with  the  clients  who  over-
borrow  suggests that  clients use credit as a way of sending a message to their social 
networks that they are too  poor to have available  savings. 
Three lab experiments in  the field test varying aspects of this constraint. Jakiela 
and  Ozier  (2012) randomizes the  provision of  gifts  of  different sizes that can  be 
invested  at  varying  rates  of  return, either  in public  or  private, in western Kenya. 
The study finds  that women who receive  the large  endowment are 9.6 percentage 
points  more  likely to invest an amount no larger  than  the small endowment when 
returns    are observable,   corresponding  to a 5.4 percentage  point  decrease in 
investment level. No similar trend is observed among male  participants. Women who 
had relatives  participating in the  game  and observing their returns were  especially 
prone to staying away from making profitable investments. Giné et al.  (2013)  tests 
how individuals within a  household revise  their intertemporal  plans over time in 
Malawi. They offer the household head and spouse  in 1071 households a series of 
independent  choices  on  the  allocation  of  a  large  sum  of  money  (one  month’s 
wages)  between  “sooner”  and  “later”  periods.  Shortly  before  the  payout,  some 
households  are  then  allowed  an  unanticipated  revision  in  their  allocations.    The 
study  finds  that  increased  initial  allocations  toward  “later”  periods  are  positively 
correlated  with baseline wealth and the number of relatives in the village. However, 
revisions  in  allocations  toward  the  present    are  not    associated    with  spousal  
preferences  for such revision,  but instead relate most strongly to tendencies toward 
present-biased  preferences. Chandrasekhar  et  al.  (2013)  conducts a  randomized 
lab  experiment in  the  field with  villagers from  rural Karnataka in south India that 
has  participants  playing  variants  of  a  consumption-smoothing  game  with 
members  of their  social network. The  study  reports  that  access to  savings allows 
individuals  to  smooth some  of the income  risk  they  face inter-temporally that is 
not  insured  inter-personally. In  the absence of  savings,  limited  commitment  to 
transfers seems  to  bind significantly when  two  individuals  are  socially distant  in 
the network,  but less so when they are socially close. 
In their study on reducing the cost of accessing a simple formal savings account 
in  Kenya, Dupas and Robinson (2013a)  notes  that the  accounts led  to significant 
increases  in  microenterprise investment and expenditures, despite  no interest being 
offered  on  the  savings  balances and  despite  withdrawal fees being charged to take 
money out. They are unable to identify any mechanism, but discuss the possibility 
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of  social  pressure,  risk-aversion,  and/or  time-inconsistency  driving  this  result.15 
However,  the experiment  in Brune et al. (2013) produces  little evidence to support  
the  importance  of  “other-control”  (as  opposed  to  “self-control”)  motives  and 
account features.  Specifically, their  commitment treatment did  not in  fact  lead  to 
lower  reported transfers to  other households relative to the comparison  group, or to 
the ordinary  savings account group. Nor did a sub-experiment that publicly revealed 
savings balances affect behavior.  We discuss this paper  further in Section 2.5.1. 
In  all,  there is  mounting evidence  from many different settings that social 
claimants induce  individuals to  engage  in  strategic  behavior—including 
commitment, concealment, and saving less.  But this evidence is  more suggestive and 
descriptive  than definitive. Most  of the evidence comes from  surveys and  lab-like 
settings rather than real-world choices.  And much of the  evidence is consistent with 
other  interpretations.  Disentangling  social-  vs.  self-control  motives  for  saving 
behavior, and  fleshing out  their  implications for  savings rates  and  product design, 
will be particularly important going forward. 
 
 
2.5. Behavioral Biases 
 
The  behavioral social  sciences  suggest  several  cognitive  tendencies that can 
lead  to  undersaving or  more  broadly to  “present-bias.”  Behavioral research has 
documented biases  in  preferences  (costly  self-control, loss  aversion, anticipatory 
utility);  in  expectations/perceptions  of  prospects  (e.g.,  over-optimism);  in  price 
perceptions (e.g.,  exponential growth bias);  and in  whether and how  to  make  a 
decision  conditional  on  all  other  variables  (e.g.,  limited  attention,  planning 
fallacies). Understanding these biases  can help us  identify more and less malleable 
drivers of undersaving, and design products and processes that  help people save as 
they aspire to in their more reflective moments.  Our review below focuses on field 
(not  lab)  evidence  linking  specific behavioral  biases  to  savings  behavior  in 
developing  countries;  see DellaVigna  (2009) for  a  broader  review,  and  Zinman 
(forthcoming)  for  a  complementary  review  of  behavioral theories and evidence 
related  to over-borrowing. 
 
 
2.5.1. Bias in Preferences 
 
2.5.1.a. Living for today:  sources and implications of costly self-control 
 
Causal  empiricism  suggests  that  people  struggle  with  self-control  in  many 
domains. Over-eating, over-snoozing, under-saving, etc.  have  all been  attributed to 
a  human tendency  to  “live  for  today.” Then  when  tomorrow arrives  it  is today 
again!  Economists often formalized this  carpe  diem  tendency in  “multiple-self  ” 
frameworks, where the “present-self ” may use the snooze button intensely  while 
assuming that  future  selves will spring out of bed with the initial alarm  (Laibson, 
 
 
15They also note that usage has  a strong positive  correlation with wealth  levels in their  sample 
(Dupas and Robinson, 2013a). 
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1997; O’Donoghue and Levy, 1999; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006).16 In the savings 
context, this dynamic can manifest as procrastinating  behavior change (I will cut 
back  a  bit  and  start  saving—tomorrow),  and/or  as  consumption  splurges 
(succumbing to temptation  to consume today, perhaps by  borrowing). Models of 
costly self-control also tend to deliver the key prediction  that individuals will value 
commitment;  that  is,  people  will  choose,  and  even  pay,  to  restrict  their  future 
choices in  some way, to help discourage their future selves from overconsuming. We 
now  review  empirical  evidence  on  these  key  predictions,  starting  with 
commitment. 
 
 
(Self-)commitment devices 
Individuals who  are  (partly)  sophisticated about their  carpe diem tendencies  may 
want  to  constrain the  actions  of  future selves. The  intuition is that while  today’s 
self wants to live for today, she is relatively indifferent between consumption in any 
future period; that is, today’s self may be very impatient  when it comes to tradeoffs 
between today and tomorrow, but very patient  when it comes to tradeoffs  between 
tomorrow  and  any  future  period.  So  today’s  self  may  want  to  make  a  plan to 
smooth  consumption  in  the  future—perhaps  by  saving  for  bad  shocks,  or  for 
retirement. And  if  today’s  self  recognizes  that future selves  will  want to  deviate 
from  this  plan,  today’s  self  may  want  to  make  a  commitment  that  makes 
deviating  costly  (e.g.,  that  makes  a  future  self  pay  a  penalty  in  that  self’s 
“today”). This   demand  for   commitment  is  absent   in   standard/neoclassical  
models  of  intertemporal  consumer  choice,  where  preferences/discounting  are 
time-consistent, and hence  I  make plans and stick  to  them, unless  something in  my 
choice  set  changes  that  leads  me  to  re-optimize  my  plan.  In standard  models, 
flexibility  and choices are always good when it comes to managing my own decision-
making subject to constraints. I might still however make binding  commitments to 
influence the behavior of others (see Section 2.4). 
Commitment devices can  take  several  forms.  Commitment devices that call 
for  real  economic  penalties for  failure,  or  rewards for  success, are  referred  to  as 
hard commitments, while  devices  that have  primarily psychological  consequences 
are considered  soft commitments.  This is really a spectrum,  though, not a clear and 
easy-to-assign  binary characteristic. A hard commitment device may take the form 
of  a  formal commitment savings  account where  interest is forfeited  if a  monthly 
deposit is not made, or an agricultural savings account in  which withdrawals before 
a  pre-set  target  date  corresponding  with  the  sowing  season  incur  a  substantial 
penalty. A soft commitment  device might be a separate account  labeled “School 
Fees,”  where  the  depositor  incurs  a  psychological  cost  of  guilt  or  loss  when 
withdrawing funds for non-education expenses (see Shefrin and Thaler (1988, 1992) 
on  the  application  of  mental  accounting  models  to  saving  and  consumption 
decisions). Default settings may also serve  as soft commitments for future  choices 
using the power of inertia. 
 
16Other  models  focus  more  directly  on  temptation  (Gul  and  Pesendorfer,  2004;  Banerjee  and 
Mullainathan,  2010)—i.e.,  on the possibility that people get disutility from having the option to consume 
certain  goods—and  deliver  similar  predictions  on  consumption  dynamics  and  antidotes  to  over-
consumption. 
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The  first field experiment on  a hard commitment device to  enable  improved 
saving in a developing country  setting concerned  a savings account  developed and 
tested by Ashraf et al. (2006a) in collaboration with Green Bank in the Philippines. 
The  bank created a  savings  product called  SEED (Save,  Earn, Enjoy Deposits) that 
offered  the  choice of two  commitment features  to  a sample  of existing clients of 
Green  Bank:  either  a  time-based  maturity, in  which  the  account balance  would 
become  available  only at  a specific future date  (such as the time of a wedding or 
celebration),  or  an  amount-based  maturity,  in  which  funds  would  become 
available once a certain  goal was reached  (such as the  money  needed  to repair  a 
house).  The  clients  could  freely  choose  to  apply  either  or  neither  of  these 
restrictions on their accounts. However, once  the  decision  was  made, SEED clients 
could not withdraw  funds until they met their chosen goal. Clients were also given 
the chance to opt  for a lock box to make deposits  at home,  before bringing  them 
to the bank. 
The SEED  accounts offered  reduced  liquidity  for the borrower, but  no other 
compensating interest  or financial incentive. Nonetheless, take-up was high, with 
28 percent  of individuals opening  an  account. After  one  year,  individuals offered 
accounts  increased savings balances by roughly 411 pesos or 82 percent, relative to 
the  comparison  group. Among  the  subgroup of  individuals who  actually opened 
the  account, savings  balances were  estimated to  have  increased by  roughly four 
times this amount, with clients increasing their savings by over 300 percent relative 
to the comparison group.  In line with the self-control theory,  individuals  identified 
as time-inconsistent were the ones most likely to show a preference for and benefit 
from commitment.  The  longer-term impact of  the  product on  savings  balances 
over a two and a half year period  was a 33 percent  increase,  which was no longer 
statistically  significant (Ashraf et al., 2010). However, this can be interpreted either 
as a lowered savings rate,  or as the savings having been withdrawn and  converted 
into  a  lump-sum expenditure that improved welfare.  The  bank  did  not  engage  in 
any  continued marketing, even  to  the  clients  who  used  the  account. This  shows 
that although the  product achieved  medium-term  goals,  it  did  not cause  lasting 
behavior change  of  the  same  magnitude; to  achieve  that, one  may  either  need  to 
reinforce the commitment, or it could be that  the same medium-term  behavior  was 
not  deemed optimal by the clients and they reverted  after  proper analysis. 
In  a  test  of  access  to  savings  accounts that included an  assessment of  self-
control  bias  vs.  “other-control”  problems  in  goal-attainment  and  investment, 
Brune  et  al.  (2013) randomizes  access  to  ordinary  and  commitment  savings 
products  among  3150  smallholder  tobacco  farmers  in  Malawi  organized  into  299 
farmer  clubs. One third  of the farmers’ clubs in the study were assisted in opening 
ordinary savings accounts, another third were assisted  in opening  both ordinary and 
commitment savings accounts, and  the  final third served as the comparison group 
without assistance  in opening  either  type of account. Those  who opened  a savings 
account  had  the  proceeds  from  their  tobacco  sales deposited  directly 
(electronically) into their ordinary savings  account. For those opening commitment 
accounts, funds would be  deposited into their ordinary account until the  “trigger” 
level chosen by them  was reached,  after  which funds  would be deposited into  the 
commitment account until  its pre-set  target  level was reached  (all targets set  by 
the  individual).  For  the  groups  offered  savings  accounts,  a  subset  of  each  was 
chosen to receive raffle  tickets (some in  private and some in  public) that revealed 
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the savings balance  in their accounts, and their outcomes  were measured against  a 
subset  of  farmers  that  received  the  savings  accounts  but  no  raffle  tickets  that 
revealed this information. 
Take-up of the offer of a commitment  account  along with an ordinary account 
was  20.7  percent, compared to  an  18.1  percent take-up rate  for  just  the ordinary 
savings  account.  Providing  tobacco  farmers  in  the  sample  with  access  to  any 
savings  account  positively  affected  their  savings  level  against  the  comparison 
group  (significantly increasing total  deposits by 16,513 MK  and 18,801 MK  in the 
ordinary and commitment  treatment  arms, respectively). However, the impact on 
agricultural investment,  crop output, and household  spending differed between the 
two types of savings treatments. The study  found  that the group  that opened both 
a  commitment  savings  account alongside an ordinary account saw  a  7.7 percent 
increase in land  under cultivation, a 17.1 percent  increase in agricultural input  use 
during  planting,  a  20.1  percent  increase  in  crop  output at  harvest,  and  a  13.5 
percent  increase in household  expenditures  in the months  just after the harvest vs. 
the comparison group  that  received no  account.  While no  significant  increase  in 
these outcomes  was measured  for the ordinary savings account  group,  the authors 
are unable to reject that  the effects of the two accounts  are equal. The study would 
need to be replicated with a larger sample and more statistical  power to distinguish 
the differential  impacts  of ordinary vs. commitment savings accounts. 
What  is intriguing in this study is that  91 percent  of the savings deposited  by 
those offered a commitment savings account  (that  led to the large impacts) were in 
fact  kept  in the  ordinary accounts held  by these  individuals. Money  is withdrawn 
relatively quickly after it is  deposited into the ordinary savings account. The amount  
actually maintained  in  the commitment  savings account that had the withdrawal 
restriction  until the target  date was reached  was in fact very small. This points to  a 
few  alternative  possibilities  on  the  mechanism  behind  the  impact  of  the 
commitment  savings  account,  but  none  that  the  data  in  the  current  study  can 
support. We see that  the commitment mechanism is certainly not working through 
the  “tying  of  one’s  hands” to  resist  self-control bias.  An  alternative explanation 
involves a signaling explanation for this behavior, where the commitment savings 
account allows people the ability to better  resist social network  demands  for their 
savings. However, this is not supported by the fact that  the commitment treatment 
did not  in fact see lower reported transfers to other  households.17 
Other  explanations include the possibility that  the cost of the commitment on 
the account with  this  feature was  very  low,  which  effectively  made it  simply  a 
second  regular  savings  account  that  might  have  triggered  more  “mental 
accounting”  mechanisms  driving  the  differential  impact.  The  authors  themselves 
recognize that clients  had to  travel long  distances (20 kilometers on  average) to  the 
bank branch and  endure  a median  wait time of an  hour  to  withdraw money  from 
their ordinary accounts, imposing high transaction  costs  that might have led  to the 
“withdraw soon  after  the  deposit  is made”  behavior. Finally,  the  electronic  direct 
deposit of tobacco sales proceeds only applied to those who opened an individual 
 
17The sub-experiment that  involved the public revelation  of savings balances did not lead to lower 
savings, which would be the case if claims from expectant social networks  were in fact a major  reason 
for people to choose to lock away funds in arrangements that made their funds inaccessible (though  this 
was ineffective in part due to the low balances  maintained in the commitment accounts). 
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savings account, which combines  the  effect of the  bank  account as a new savings 
location but  also as a new payment channel,  in contrast to  the  comparison group 
that only  transacted  in  cash. Despite the  promising evidence  of  increased crop 
output  and  post-harvest  household  spending  results,  therefore,  this  study  raises 
numerous questions for further dissection. 
Dupas  and Robinson (2013b) is the first field experiment  that  tests the effects 
of  different  varieties  of  commitment  savings  options  on  behavior,  randomizing 
members  of  existing  ROSCAs  in  Kenya  to  one  of  five  groups.  Two  treatment 
groups  were  offered  a  lockbox  for  saving  at  home  (that  was  earmarked  for 
preventative healthcare expenses).18 Individuals in the Safe Box group were given the 
key along with the box. Individuals in the Lock  Box group  were not given the key, 
and  had  to  call the  program officer to  open  the  box.  In  a third treatment group, 
individuals  were encouraged to save in an individual  Health  Savings Account that 
would  be held  at  the  ROSCA and  earmarked for  emergency health expenditures 
only. In a fourth treatment group,  individuals were encouraged to use their existing 
ROSCA to create a Health Pot, in which members would contribute an additional 
amount  during regular meetings earmarked  for preventative health expenses.  The 
Health  Pot  thus  tries  to  harness  social  pressure  as  a  commitment  device,  in 
addition to earmarking.19 There is also a fifth, comparison, group. 
To  us,  the  comparison  between  the  Safe  Box  and  Lock  Box  treatments  is 
particularly interesting, because this is the only test we know of between a softer vs. 
harder commitment in the  same  sample  and  for  the  same  savings  goal.20 Harder 
commitments may  provide more  self-control, but at  a cost  of reduced flexibility for 
dealing  with bad  shocks,  and  less leeway for  those  whose behavioral  biases may 
also impede their ability to set optimal  commitments. The study finds a 74 percent 
take-up rate (defined as a non-zero amount  in the given  box/account)  of the Safe 
Box  after  the  first six months and  a 65 percent  take-up of the  Lock  Box  over the 
same period.  Usage  of the  products  12 months  after  they  were offered  remained 
high  at  71  and  66  percent,  respectively.  The  Safe  Box  significantly  increased 
spending   on  the  target   preventative   healthcare   expenditures   by  170 KSh (66 
percent  increase  over the comparison group), while the  Lock  Box  in contrast had 
a  much  smaller  and  statistically  insignificant  positive  effect on  the  same  target 
outcome. The total  stock of savings was not  measured in this study. 
Usage of the other  two options  was higher: 97 percent  for the Health Savings 
Account (HSA),  and  72 percent  for the Health  Pot after  12 months. Both  of these 
interventions produced strong improvements in healthcare expenditures, albeit with 
slightly  different  targets.  The  Health  Pot  product  was  designed  to  save  up  for 
preventative  healthcare expenses (like the Safe Box and Lock  Box treatments) and 
increased  spending on  preventative healthcare by  331 KSh  (128 percent  over  the 
comparison group). The HSA intervention was  designed for emergency health 
 
 
18See also Giné et al. (2010) where savings balances provide  a commitment device for another type 
of health  investment:  quitting smoking. 
19See also the Brune et al. (2013) and Kast et al. (2012) papers  discussed in this section. 
20See also Benhassine et al. (2013) on a comparison of soft versus hard  commitments in improving 
school  attendance among beneficiaries  of  cash  transfer programs in  Morocco: the  unconditional but 
labeled  education  payment  transfer  (“nudge”)  performs  better  than  the  conditional  cash  transfer  for 
educational expenses (“shove”). 
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spending,  and  had  no  impact  on  preventative health  expenditures (as anticipated) 
but a significant 12 percentage point reduction (from a 31 percent comparison level) 
in  the  inability  to  afford  full  medical  treatment for  an  illness in  the  past  three 
months. 
The  results  confirm  the  presence  of all three  types of savings barriers: intra-
personal,  inter-personal, and intra-household.21 Intra-personal behavioral  barriers 
did  seem  to  matter  significantly.  Those  whose  savings  preferences  were  not 
constant  over time (as measured  by survey questions)  were not able to benefit from 
the Safe Box (because it was too easy for them to access the money). They also did 
not benefit from the Lock Box—this  is because even though  the savings in the box 
were illiquid,  there  wasn’t a strong  incentive  to  actually  put  money  into  the  box 
in  the first  place.  However, they  did  benefit  from the  stronger commitment  and 
social pressure  to make deposits  that was provided by the Health Pot. 
Although    the  handful  of  field  experiments  on  commitment  savings  have 
focused on the development  of new products and features,22 it is important to note 
that  the  popularity  of  some  more-established  products  may  be  attributable  to 
commitment  features.  For  example,  ROSCAs  may  be  popular,    and  effective, 
because they  allow  people  to commit themselves  to save.  Gugerty (2007)  finds 
evidence to this effect when querying members from 70 ROSCAs  in western Kenya 
regarding their motivations  for participating.  The same seems  to be true for illiquid 
retirement savings products in more-developed countries (Laibson et al., 2000). Opt-
out defaults  into  savings products (which are increasingly  prevalent  for retirement 
savings  in  more-developed countries) may be  effective  because they provide soft 
commitments that do not get undone due to procrastination or inattention (Beshears 
et al., 2010a).23 
 
 
Evidence on correlations between present-bias and under-saving 
There is a  striking lack  of  empirical evidence  on  the  other two  key  predictions of 
costly self-control  models. In fact we are not  aware  of any nationally representative 
evidence on the conditional correlations between  present-bias and (under-)saving, 
or on whether the high-frequency dynamics of consumption/savings decisions  match 
a (splurge  and  scourge) pattern distinct to a costly self-control model. 
 
 
21Inter-personal barriers were substantial—those who  were previously  giving assistance  to others 
without  receiving assistance in return  benefited more than others. There was evidence of intra-household 
barriers  as  well:  the  effects  of  several  of  the  interventions  were  larger  (though  not  statistically 
significantly  so)  for  married  individuals.  See  Section  2.4  for  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  social 
constraints. 
22See also Duflo  et al. (2011), where an option to pay for next season’s fertilizer input  at harvest 
time dramatically increases fertilizer purchases, and  Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011), where delaying CCT 
payment until  school  fees are  due actually  increases re-enrollment relative  to  earlier  payment. Both  of 
these  findings  are  consistent with  demand for  commitments to  save.  They  may  also,  or  instead, be 
solving limited attention problems, as discussed in Section 2.5.4. 
23See Kast  et al. (2012) for an  evaluation of self-help peer group  enforcement among  microcredit 
clients in Chile. They find a three-fold  increase in savings deposit  frequency and a two-fold  increase in 
savings balances from peer group enforcement.  Also see Atkinson et al. (2012) for a recent study on the 
impact of default contribution rates, and to a lesser extent planning and reminders, on savings behavior 
among  microcredit clients in Guatemala. 
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2.5.1.b. Loss aversion 
 
Loss  aversion  relative  to  some  reference  point  (e.g.,  current  consumption, 
neighbors’  consumption) is sometimes  invoked  as potential obstacle  to consumers 
reducing  their  debt  loads  (Karlan  and  Zinman,  2012)—or,  more  broadly,  to 
consumers increasing their savings rates (Benartzi  and Thaler,  2004)—but we have 
yet to see this intuition worked  out  theoretically, or tested empirically. 
 
2.5.2. Biases in Expectations (Over-Optimism) 
 
Beyond preferences, expectations  about  key parameters—e.g., those affecting 
the  budget  constraint—play  a  key  role  in  intertemporal  choice  modeling. 
Brunnermeier  and Parker  (2005) develops a theory that  rationalizes  over-optimism 
about future income based on anticipatory  utility. Their model can generate under-
saving; more  precisely,  it  generates less saving  than a  world  where  people have 
accurate  expectations  of  future  income  (because  they  do  not  get  utility  from 
anticipating higher income). We are not aware of any field tests of this interesting 
model. 
Recently,  policy  and  programmatic  concerns  have  focused  more  on  over-
optimism  about  future  cash  flows  more  broadly,  and  about  prices  (particularly 
regarding  underestimating the likelihood  of incurring  “add-on” prices like penalty 
fees). The literature on these concerns is thin, and focused on consumer debt markets 
in the U.S.; see Zinman (forthcoming) for a review. 
 
2.5.3. Biases in Price Perceptions (Underestimating Compound Interest) 
Consumers might also underestimate the value of saving more directly, even 
(in  the  extreme)  when  facing  certain  returns.  For  example,  there  may  be  a 
distinction  between  the  vector  of  prices  economists  typically  use  to  capture  the 
cost–benefit of moving  consumption across  different  periods (where, for instance, 
the cost is foregone consumption today,  and the benefit is a return  on investment), 
and how the consumer  perceives that  vector of prices. Stango  and  Zinman  (2009) 
shows that the  flip side of the  well-known  underestimation of compound growth 
is an underestimation of how  quickly  principal  is paid  back  on  installment debt, 
with a more  general  exponential  growth bias explaining both tendencies. They  also 
find some evidence that  more-biased  households save less in a representative sample 
of U.S. households.24 
Song (2013) tests the impact  of financial education that  focuses on compound 
interest  with a field experiment  that  randomly assigned 1,104 households to one of 
three  groups in Shaanxi province, China. One treatment group was taught principles 
of  compound interest, with  application to  pension contributions and balances. A 
second  treatment  group  was  given  information  on  expected  levels  of  pension 
benefits  for  differing  levels  of  contributions  without  compound  interest  being 
fully  explained.  The  study  finds  that  the  group  instructed  on  the  principles  of 
compounding improves knowledge on a financial literacy test, though  the increase 
is not significant for most questions  (except the question  on compound interest on 
 
24See Levy and Tasoff (2013) for a lab experiment  testing the theoretical  predictions  of exponential 
growth  bias. 
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which the intervention reduces  the distance  from  the correct  answer  significantly 
by  one-sixth  of  a  standard  deviation).  Both  groups  contributed  more  than  the 
comparison group, with  the  principles  group saving  about 40 percent more,  and 
the information-only (no principles) group  saving about 19 percent  more.25 
 
2.5.4. Biases in Problem-Solving (Inattention to Savings) 
 
A  fourth  category  of  biases  relates  to  whether  and  how  individuals  make 
decisions  (i.e.,  optimize  in  an  economic  model)  given  their  preferences, 
expectations,  and  (perceptions of) prices. For  instance,  to  the  extent  that  savings 
requires planning  (e.g., making  a budget),  the  well-known  planning  fallacy  may 
come into play,  whereby  individuals tend  to  underestimate the  amount of  effort 
needed to actually complete a task. We  are not aware of any field  evidence  linking 
the planning  fallacy  to  saving  behavior (although see  Spiller  and  Lynch,  2010). 
Currently the leading problem-solving   explanations  for (under-)saving  behavior 
revolve around inattention to certain aspects of the tradeoffs  involved in allocating 
consumption over time. We now consider  these. 
 
Inattention, reminders, and marketing 
 
It  seems plausible to  think that spending and borrowing are  more “top of mind” 
for many people than  saving.26 Casual  empiricism suggests that  firms have stronger 
incentives to promote (e.g., advertise) spending  and borrowing than  they do saving. 
Shah  et al. (2012) and  Mani  et al. (2013) postulate that  extreme  scarcity in one’s 
budget constraint—whether in time, money, etc.—can generate a laser-like focus on 
alleviating the immediate scarcity, at the expense of other aspects of one’s life. Since 
the act  of saving has at  best a weakly negative  ability  to alleviate any immediate 
scarcity, it  stands to reason that saving is  likely  to be  neglected if scarcity  does 
indeed affect decision quality. 
Karlan    et  al.  (2012)  explores  the  top  of  mind  intuition    with  a  particular 
assumption that  focuses on the possibility that  people tend to forget “exceptional” 
(infrequent, and relatively large)  expenditure needs/opportunities à  la  Sussman and 
Alter  (2012).  They  show  theoretically  that  such  an  attention  bias  will  lead  to 
under-saving; conversely,  if people  anticipated exceptional  expenses—school  fees, 
fertilizer  purchases, etc.—they  would  save more.  In this sense limited attention is 
an alternative or complementary explanation  for many of  the phenomena discussed 
above, including the effects of soft commitments  on behavior.  For example, health-
labeled    accounts  might  increase  saving  because  they  draw  attention  to  future 
(exceptional) health  expenses that would otherwise  escape attention. 
Indeed limited attention models generate the distinct prediction  that attention 
shocks—e.g., reminders to save—will affect savings behavior.27  Karlan  et al. (2012) 
 
25The author estimates  that if participants maintain the  same  increased  contribution levels going 
forward, this  would  lead  to  a  4.8  percent increase  in  estimated consumption  each  year  after age  60 
(Song, 2013). 
26See  DellaVigna  (2009)  for  a  review  of  field  evidence  on  the  nature  and  impacts  of  limited 
attention in other  domains. 
27Exogenous  attention  shocks  will not  actually  affect  behavior,  even  if  people  have  limited 
attention, if  people are  perfectly  sophisticated  about their limited attention  and have  access  to  low-
cost reminder technologies. 
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tests this hypothesis,28 and a  hypothesis particular  to their model—that reminders 
about  exceptional  expenses will be particularly effective—in field experiments with 
three  different  banks  in Bolivia,  Peru,  and  the  Philippines.  Each  bank randomly 
assigned  a  sample  of  new  clients  with  a  “goal-based  savings  account”29  to  a 
reminder treatment or  comparison (no-reminder) group. Reminder content varied 
across  banks  due  to  operational  and  branding  considerations,  and  also  varied 
randomly within banks based on hypotheses  about  which reminders  would be most 
salient  and  effective for savers.  Pooling  across  the three  settings,  individuals who 
received  reminders  deposited  more  than  the  comparison  group.  Reminders 
increased  the  total  amount  saved  at  the  bank  by  6  percent  and  increased  the 
likelihood  that  individuals  reached  their  saving  goal  by  3  percentage  points  (6 
percent).30 
The study also finds that  reminder  content  matters. In Peru, the bank  elicited 
the client’s planned  future  expenditure, and messages in Peru only changed savings 
behavior when  they  mentioned that  client-specific plan.  Messages  in Bolivia  were 
only effective when they  mentioned the  client’s extrinsic  incentive  (free insurance 
from the  bank) for  sticking  to  her  plan. The  authors infer  that messages  which 
increase the salience of the benefits of saving, whether current benefits (as in financial 
incentives)  or  future benefits  (as  in  meeting  a  specific goal),  are  highly effective. 
They also emphasize that some reminder messages did not change savings behavior, 
and  other  variations found  to matter  in other  domains  (e.g., loss vs. gain framing) 
did  not  have  differential  effects in  this  study.  On  a  closely related note, several 
other studies have found that marketing content strongly affects financial  behavior, 
including  saving.31 
The prospect  of using messaging to encourage saving is a promising one, given 
the relatively low  costs  of  digital communication,  the difficultly  of  using  other 
levers  (like  opt-out defaults) in  many  settings,  and the  promising if  preliminary 
results sketched above. Future tests  would  do  well  to  experiment with  channel, 
sender  (e.g.,  firm  or  peer),  customization,  and  frequency/duration32    as  well  as 
content.33  We  suspect that  variation on these  margins can  be  used  not only  to 
optimize messaging  strategies, but also  to  test  and refine behavioral theories of 
 
 
28Many  studies have tested reminders  for health  behaviors; see Karlan et al. (2012) for citations. 
29The subjects in these studies were all people  who had  made some plan  to save. The Philippines 
bank’s clients had an account with a hard  commitment: they could not  withdraw  funds until they had 
reached  a pre-set  goal amount. The Peruvian  bank  asked  clients for a specific future  expenditure goal 
and  offered  an  8 percent interest rate  (as opposed to  the  normal 4 percent)  to  clients  who  made  and 
adhered to a plan for monthly deposits. The Bolivian bank account  was marketed  as a vehicle for saving 
for a “13th-month” of earned income, and the bank again doubled  the interest rate (3 to 6 percent) and 
offered free life and accident insurance to clients who made and adhered to a plan for monthly deposits. 
30See Kast  et al.’s (2012) experiment  among  microcredit  clients in Chile comparing the salience of 
in-person interaction  and social  pressure in  peer  groups, versus  the  effect  of  reminders to  save  that 
simply involve transferring information to the client on a regular  basis. 
31Bertrand et al. (2010) finds strong  impacts  of persuasive  advertising  on the take-up of expensive 
consumer  loans  in  South  Africa.  Goda  and  Manchester  (2013)  and  Choi  et  al.  (2012)  find  that 
behaviorally-motivated direct  mail and  email content affects retirement plan contributions in the U.S. 
See also Mullainathan et al. (2008). 
32Stango  and Zinman (2013) finds that  subtle attention shocks can have cumulative  effects related 
to bank  overdrafting behavior in the U.S. 
33Beyond persuasion and reminders,  messaging/marketing may also be a relatively efficient way to 
deliver information, as discussed in Section 2.3. 
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attention  and  other  factors.  It  is  also  critical  to  measure  whether  and  how 
messaging  affects  net  saving;  does  behavior change  at  the  household (as opposed 
to  just  the  bank-/account-level),  or  is  (competition  by)  messaging  a  zero-sum 
game? The  Shah  et  al. (2012) and  Mani  et  al. (2013) framework also  raises  the 
possibility that drawing attention to one margin (e.g., saving) could reduce decision 
quality in other  domains (e.g., borrowing, health, etc.). 
 
 
3. Taking Stock of the Evidence 
 
What  are we to make of the evidence so far? What  does the current  pattern of 
results  tell  us  about  the  importance  of  constraints  to  saving  among  poor 
households  and  the  welfare implications of relaxing  some of these constraints? Do 
we have any understanding on  which of our  five classes of constraints appears to 
be most binding? In which areas are the policy and product  design implications  of 
the  evidence  clear  and  actionable,  and  which  areas  need  more  innovation  and 
evaluation  before we can identify what  works and  why? 
Taking a stand on  these questions when empirical  testing  is still very much in 
progress  is  difficult.  Table  1  captures  key  statistics  from  a  number  of  studies 
discussed  in  this  paper.  We  emphasize  that  nearly  all  studies  stop  far  short  of 
welfare analysis: they measure  only short-run effects, and  do not  tell us anything 
about net  savings (e.g., whether  there  is crowd-out or  crowd-in),  much  less about 
whether  clients’ overall financial condition and  well-being improves  (see Section 4 
for related  discussion on measurement). Nevertheless,  we do find some noteworthy 
patterns,  including real  progress in  the  theory-testing  that supports a  “diagnose 
and treat” approach to policy, programmatic, and profit-driven innovations. 
 
3.1. Large Impacts of Savings Access on Income and Wealth: 
From Evidence to Implications 
 
Five studies so far find evidence of very large impacts of access to a subsidized 
or specialized savings product  on downstream income, expenditures,  and/or wealth 
(Brune  et  al.,  2013;  Dupas  and  Robinson,  2013a,  2013b;  Prina,  2013; Schaner, 
2013a).  Do these  results replicate in  other settings?  If  the  impacts are robust, what 
exactly  prevents  households from  reproducing the  savings  “technology,”  at  least 
approximately,  informally;  i.e.,  what  is it  about  the  new  formal  (or  improved 
informal)  products  that  dominates  other  informal  mechanisms?  It  would  be 
particularly interesting  to  test  whether  large impacts  would  persist  in a (general) 
equilibrium setting  where  everyone  has  access  to  the  same  savings  mechanisms. 
For instance,  might  the  results  thus  far  be driven  by those  with  access to  formal 
accounts stealing  business  from  those  without access  (zero-sum competition)? A 
design  that randomizes the  intensity of  access  treatments  across  space  or  social 
networks holds  the  potential for  identifying  how  these  (or  other)  spillovers affect 
the results and the interpretation thereof. 
 
3.2. Gaps between Take-up,  Usage, and Impacts 
 
Take-up  rates for products  with commitment features tend to run in the 20–30 
percent range. Take-up rates are sometimes higher for no-frills accounts,  especially 
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TABLE  1 
Key  Statistics from Studies Evaluating Savings Impact in the Developing World 
 
 
 
Study, Country 
 
 
Treatment 
 
 
Measurement 
Timeframe 
Take-up of Savings 
Account (share of 
the entire treatment 
group) 
Active Usage of 
Savings Account 
(share of the entire 
treatment group) 
 
Increase  in Savings Balance 
(% or level increase over 
the comparison group) 
 
 
Crowd-Out 
of Savings 
 
 
Increase  in Outcomes (% increase over the 
comparison group) 
Dupas and  Robinson  Reducing opening  fees for a  6 Months  87%  41% (2 or more  9.36 Ksh  increase in daily  No  crowding-  37% increase in daily private  expenditures; 
(2013a), Kenya  simple bank  savings account     
transactions)  average  bank  savings  out  38–56% increase in average daily business 
investment 
Prina  (2013), Nepal  Reducing opening  fees and 
reducing  distance  to transaction 
point  for a simple bank  savings 
account 
1 Year  84%  80% (2 or more 
deposits) 
25% increase in monetary 
assets 
No  crowding-
out 
20% increase in educational expenditures; 
15% increase on fish and  meat expenditures; 
Smaller reduction in weekly income when 
hit by a health  shock 
Cole et al. (2011), 
Indonesia 
Varying subsidies to open simple 
bank  savings accounts 
2 Years  Low incentive: 
3.5%; 
Medium incentive: 
8.9%; 
High  Incentive: 
12.7% 
       
Dupas et al. (2012), 
Kenya 
Reduce  opening  fees for a simple 
bank  savings account 
1 Year  62%  18% (2 or more 
deposits)       
Schaner  (2013c), 
Kenya 
Reduce  issuing fee for an ATM 
debit  card (reduces withdrawal fee 
by half ) 
6 Months  Savings account: 
100% (by design); 
ATM  card:  >86% 
22.7% (1 or more 
transactions)       
Schaner  (2013b), 
Kenya 
Varying  interest  rates and 
intra-household ownership of 
simple bank  savings accounts 
6 Months  100%  43% (1 or more 
transactions)       
Schaner  (2013a),  Varying  interest  rates on simple  6 Months;  High-interest rate:  High-interest rate:      $15 in higher  monthly income for individual 
Kenya  bank  savings accounts (long-run 
impacts) 
3 Years  49.2%; 
Low-interest rate: 
31.4% 
14.7% (1 or more 
transactions over first 
6 months); 
11.7% (1 or more 
transactions 24–36 
months after account 
opening) 
   
accounts offered the high interest  rate 
Karlan and Zinman 
(2013), Philippines 
Varying  interest  rates and 
intra-household ownership of 
commitment savings accounts 
20 Months  23%  9% (1 or more 
deposits)       
Ashraf  et al. (2006b), 
Philippines 
Door-to-door deposit  collection 
service 
15 Months  28%  14.2% (1 or more 
deposits) 
40% increase in savings 
stock     
Chin et al. (2011),  Assistance  to undocumented  5 Months  ID  Card:  87%    9 percentage point  increase  No  crowding-  Those in the treatment group  who lacked 
U.S.–Mexico  migrant workers to obtain an I.D. 
card required to open a bank 
savings account 
 
Savings Account: 
43%   
in total  savings as a share 
of income 
out  control over how remittances were spent 
increase their  income by $575 (14%) 
Seshan and Yang 
(2013), Qatar–India 
5 hour financial literacy workshop  1 Year      72.4% increase in migrant’s 
savings     
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Ashraf  et al. (2010), 
Philippines 
Goal-based commitment savings 
account 
1 Year; 
2.5 Years 
28%        0.14 SD increase on an index of 
decision-making power among  married 
women; 
Among  women with below-median 
decision-making power  at  baseline,  increase 
in  expenditure on  female-oriented consumer 
durables by 1457 Ph pesos 
Ashraf  et al. (2011), 
U.S.–El  Salvador 
Savings accounts with varying 
degrees of control over 
remittances for El Salvadorian 
emigrants in the U.S. 
6 Months  Recipient  account: 
22.9%; 
Joint  account: 
28.3%; 
Joint  and migrant 
account: 39.6% 
  For participants who had 
demand for control of 
funds,  244% increase in 
total  savings for the joint 
and  migrant account 
treatment 
No  crowding-
out   
Brune et al. (2013),  Commitment and  ordinary  1.5 Years  Ordinary account:  Ordinary account:  Ordinary account: 573%    Among  those offered the Commitment 
Malawi  savings accounts tied to tobacco 
crop  sales   
18%; Commitment 
account and 
ordinary account: 
21% 
18%; Commitment 
account and ordinary 
account: 21% 
increase in deposits  in 
project  accounts; 
Commitment account and 
ordinary account: 503% 
increase in deposits  in 
project  accounts 
 
account and the ordinary account: 
7.7% increase in land cultivation; 
17.1% increase in agricultural inputs; 
20.1% increase in agricultural output; 
13.5% increase in household expenditures 
after the next harvest 
Ashraf  et al. (2006a), 
Philippines 
Goal-based commitment savings 
account with early-withdrawal 
penalties 
1 Year  28%  ∼14% (1 or more 
deposits) 
82% increase in total 
savings balance 
No  crowding-
out   
Dupas and  Robinson 
(2013b), Kenya 
Health-oriented informal savings 
devices with varying  levels and 
types of commitment 
1 Year    Safe Box: 71%; 
Lock  Box: 66%; 
Health Pot:  72%; 
Health Savings 
Account: 97% 
    66–75% increase in preventative health 
investments  for Safe Box Treatment; 
128–138% increase in preventative health 
investments  for Health Pot Treatment; 
12 percentage point  reduction in the 
likelihood of being unable  to afford medical 
treatment (on a base of 31%) for HSA 
Treatment 
Song (2013), China  Financial education (around 
explaining  the principles of 
compound interest)  related  to 
investing in the 
government-subsidized pension 
system 
  Education (teach 
principles): 99%; 
Calculation 
(information-only): 
98% 
  Education: 40% increase in 
pension contributions; 
Calculation: 19% increase in 
pension  contributions 
  4.8% increase in estimated consumption each 
year after  age 60 from Education treatment 
Karlan  et al. (2012), 
Philippines,  Bolivia, 
and Peru 
SMS and  letter reminders  to save        6% increase in total  savings 
balance     
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when the accounts  are subsidized.  A take-up  rate  north of 20 percent  is quite high 
by the  standards of a new product launch, particularly in retail  financial  services 
(consider,  for  example,  the  slow  adoption  of  ATMs,  credit  and  other payment 
cards,  and  online  banking  in  the  U.S.).  But  even  20  percent  could  be  too  low, 
normatively speaking, given  the  large  positive  impacts of  (commitment) account 
access described  above.  The  possibility  of  sub-optimally low  take-up is certainly 
worth further scrutiny,  given  the  potential  for  the  various classes  of  constraints 
discussed above to depress take-up. For  example, it may be the case that  a lack of 
sophistication  (about    how  to  manage    one’s  self-control    problems)    depresses 
demand  for  harder  commitments;  the  pattern  of  higher  take-up  of  softer 
commitments  is consistent  with this. Of course  it may simply be the case that  the 
impacts  of  account  access  are  quite  heterogeneous,  with  individuals  sorting 
themselves efficiently into or out  of the market. 
Another striking pattern  is  the  gap  between take-up and usage.  The  usage 
rate, even  defined  leniently  as  making two  or  more deposits in  the  first  year  of 
account ownership, only  exceeds half  of  the  take-up rate  in  one  study  involving 
formal bank savings accounts  (Prina, 2013), excluding the high usage rates seen for 
informal  savings  products (Dupas and  Robinson, 2013b)—that is, most  account-
openers do  not become  account-users.  Moreover, initial  usage  typically  quickly 
depreciates  into  inactivity  after  six months or so. Future studies  would  do  well to 
unpack the  drivers  of  these  patterns. Does  learning play  an  important role? Do 
transaction costs become more important over time (e.g., as subsidies are removed)? 
Do  procrastination  and/or  inattention  take  over  once  the  initial  “on-ramp”  or 
burst  of  salience/excitement  is removed?  If  so,  can  follow-up  communication 
strategies (delivered, for  example, via  SMS)  drive  continued engagement with  the 
product and productive savings behaviors? 
 
 
3.3. Soft Commitment Devices Hold Promise 
 
Hard commitment devices that  tie the saver’s hands  to a target  goal (either a 
date or an amount or the purchase  of a particular item) seem to be less effective in 
many settings than  commitment devices that  allow for some flexibility in how the 
money  is ultimately used.  Dupas and  Robinson (2013b)  and  Brune  et al. (2013) 
find more money saved toward  exceptional  but predictable  health  and agricultural 
investments  respectively  through the  more  flexible commitment accounts offered, 
compared to the accounts  that  have more restrictions in how and  when the money 
is withdrawn and  for what  purpose it is used.34 
Given  the  risks  and  uncertainties that poor households face  on  an  ongoing 
basis,  the  option value  of  withdrawing money when  needed may  outweigh, for 
many, the  benefits  of  committing to  long-term savings.  The  basic  premise  of  a 
commitment device is the voluntary increase of the future  price of vice. In the case 
of savings, the vice is the withdrawal of funds to spend on tempting  items, rather 
 
34Similarly,  preliminary results  from  a study  on  saving  for  school  expenditures in Uganda  show 
that  a  weak  commitment  device  is  effective  for  generating  savings  for  school  expenditures  (and 
positively impacting  test scores), whereas a strong  commitment account is not  effective. For  details on 
this study, see “Smoothing the Cost of  Education: Primary School Saving in  Uganda”  (http://poverty 
-action.org/project/0079). 
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than save  for  longer-term goods.  The  evidence suggests  that if the  price  is raised 
too high, the participation constraint will bind, and people will not open or use the 
account. Similarly, people want the increased future  price of vice (i.e., the rules for 
withdrawing funds) to be state-contingent: in the case of an emergency, they want 
flexibility.35 In  some  implementations, this  means  that the  only  increase  in  price 
comes  from  psychic  costs,  much  more  in line  with  mental accounting models,  in 
which deviating  from one’s planned  savings incurs no pecuniary  or time costs with 
respect to  the  bank account, but rather just  leads  one  to  be  disappointed  with 
oneself for deviating  from one’s plan  without good cause. 
 
 
3.4. Differences in Expenditure Preferences and Bargaining Power Influence 
Household Savings 
 
Nearly  every study  highlights  some  form  of  heterogeneity  in  impacts. 
Sometimes these are theory-driven and  anticipated; often  they are discovered  ex-
post at the analysis stage. The effectiveness of offering savings accounts  seems to be 
driven in large part by who the users are. 
The alignment between the preferences of the various financial decision-makers 
in  a  household,  often  the  male  and  female  heads  of  household,  and  resulting 
strategic  behavior, is attracting particular and  deserved attention. The results thus 
far  suggest  strongly  that  intra-household  preference  and  bargaining  power 
heterogeneity depresses savings  rates.  A  handful of  antidotes to  this  have  been 
tested,  with mixed results.  Commitment savings products that  restrict  easy access 
to  accumulated funds  have  been  found to  improve women’s  ability  to  save  and 
purchase  female-oriented  durables,    and  improve  their  decision-making    in  the 
household. Transnational households  face more acute challenges in joint decision-
making, and  increasing  the  emigrant’s control of remitted funds  has  been found to 
lead to improved savings. Yet in one study that tests for this mechanism (Brune et al., 
2013),  “other-control”  treatments  do  not  impact  savings  behavior  as 
hypothesized. 
 
 
3.5. Small Monetary Subsidies Can Have Long-Term Impacts 
 
A few studies have highlighted  how small monetary subsidies, when provided 
by the research  team to pay for the opening  fees, minimum  balance  deposit,  or as 
interest  payments  to encourage  higher savings balances,  have a substantial impact 
on  the  take-up  of  formal  savings  accounts.  The  most  surprising  and  promising 
result  though is that these  small  and  time-bound subsidies  can  lead  to  long-term 
increases in income (Schaner, 2013a). There is an obvious need for more long-term 
studies to test whether such positive impacts  a few years from account-opening do 
replicate  across settings, and  why the effects might persist in this way. 
 
 
 
35This may also align with the distinctions people draw between precautionary or emergency savings 
and saving  for  lump  sums  and investment, for  each  of  which  desired  levels  of  commitment might 
vary. 
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3.6. Peer Power 
 
The  popularity  of  ROSCAs    and  other  informal/less-formal  group-based 
saving  mechanisms, combined with  several  recent  results  on  peer  influence  over 
savings decisions,  speaks  to  the  potential of unlocking the  power  of peers.  Much 
remains to  be  identified  about whether, when,  and how  peers  influence  savings 
decisions (by providing information?  attention?  soft commitment? or through other 
mechanisms).  Is  herding  on  bad  information  or  norms  a  real  concern?  Can 
financial    institutions  capture/bottle  (some)    beneficial  peer    effects  remotely, 
without  imposing  the  substantial transaction  costs  involved  in  higher-touch 
approaches (that involve, for example, regular  group  meetings)? 
 
3.7. Rethinking the Role of Financial Literacy 
 
There is little evidence to suggest that  standard, and increasingly widespread, 
programmatic  approaches  to  building  financial  literacy  are  (cost-)effective  at 
improving  savings decisions. Above  we highlight  several alternative approaches to 
improving  financial  knowledge  and  decision-making,  many  of  which  attempt to 
leverage basic behavioral and  operational insights. 
 
3.8. Simultaneous  Saving and Borrowing 
 
Simultaneous  saving  and  borrowing  has  received  too  little  attention  from 
researchers and  policymakers. In  practice, many  MFIs encourage, or  even  force, 
their loan  clients to engage in the costly practice  of simultaneously saving. On its 
face, this practice  of borrowing at  high interest  rates  while saving at  much  lower 
interest rates  is bad  economics  for  MFI clients:  why  not  just  borrow less? MFIs 
and other  stakeholders often rationalize  the practice by arguing  that  the process of 
accumulating  savings  builds  long-run habits that persist  after the  loan  has  been 
paid  off. Testing  this  hypothesis is critical.  We would  also test  whether  there  are 
other ways  to  build  habits that are  less costly  for  the  client.  For instance, could 
regular  loan  payments not  be made  a “habit” that can  be transferred to  “paying 
oneself ”  (i.e.,  saving)  once  the  loan  is  paid  back?  Combining  this  associative-
framing  approach  to  habit  formation  with  a  soft  upfront    pre-commitment  to 
continue  making  payments, to oneself, post-loan is a promising  approach that  we 
have piloted  in the U.S. and are looking  to expand. 
 
 
4. Measurement and Methodological Issues 
 
The measurement and methodological issues around savings are important to 
understand, in order  to precisely assess what each evaluation of an intervention to 
address undersaving  can teach us, and what it cannot.  We provide a brief overview 
of each in this section. 
 
4.1. Measurement Issues 
 
Savings vehicle substitution: Savings take different  forms. People save through 
bank  accounts, put  money  under  the mattress, buy investment  goods,  or purchase 
inventory for their business. An observed increase in the balance of savings accounts 
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could be offset by a decrease in other savings instruments with no overall effect on 
the  level  of  savings  (Chetty  et  al.,  2012).  Thus,  estimating  savings  accurately 
requires  measuring  different  forms  of  savings,  some  of  which  are  easier  to 
measure and with less noise (e.g., bank administrative records) and others of which 
are much more difficult to identify and are recorded subject to higher measurement 
error  (e.g., self-reported data on total  savings). 
Stocks  and/or flows? Many poor  people could in fact be saving actively even if 
asset levels are low (Collins et al., 2009). Unlike credit inflows, which can be sizable 
relative  to  household  income,  savings  flows  can  be  quite  small,  and  balances 
accumulate slowly. For smaller  flows, there  is the  compounded difficulty of poor 
recall  since  they  tend to  be  less  salient when  people respond to  questions on  a 
survey compared to large inflows and  outflows. 
Single snapshots miss dynamics: Households typically accumulate  savings over 
time until they need to withdraw  a larger amount. The timing of measurement, for 
example,  right  before  or  after  a  large  withdrawal,  matters.  Having  a  more 
representative picture of  the level of  savings  requires measuring savings  balances at 
multiple  points  in time. 
Inference  when there is measurement  error: If someone reduces  consumption 
little by little and  then  buys  a durable good  with  the  savings,  we are  more  likely 
to  measure  successfully the  durable good  than  the  consumption reduction. When 
the  durable good  is an  investment—that is, income-generating—one can  at  least 
compare  discounted    consumption,  and  determine  under  which  discount  rates 
household  welfare  increases.  When  the  durable  good  is  a  consumption  item, 
however,  the  welfare  implication typically  resorts to  assumptions using  revealed 
preferences. 
Noisy accounting:  how  is  saving  funded?  Increased savings  flows  into  one 
savings vehicle  must come from somewhere. There are only four possibilities: (a)  
lower   consumption,  (b)   increased   debt,   (c)   lower   savings   elsewhere,  (d) 
increased  income.  Welfare  considerations  depend  critically  on  understanding 
where the funds came from. The worst-case scenario, for instance, is someone  who 
saves more by borrowing  more, and pays more interest on their debt than they earn 
on their savings (as is typical in most situations). Yet, for reasons just stated above, 
this is not always so easy to measure,  as savings flows are often in small amounts, 
and  may  require  asking  in recall.  Or,  savings could  come from  informal savings, 
which are difficult to measure  as well. 
 
 
4.2. Methodological Issues 
 
Impact evaluations of interventions to  improve  savings  have  posed  different 
questions, and can be categorized into three types: 
• Formal  versus  no  formal  savings:  Facilitate access  to  a  particular savings 
account  and then compare  outcomes for those with and without  that savings 
account (Dupas and Robinson, 2013a; Prina, 2013). 
•  Product  design  tests:  Change  the  design  of  a  savings  product,  thereby 
exogenously  increasing  savings  balances—for  example,  though  a 
commitment  device—and  compare  the  difference  in  outcomes  between 
groups  with  different  level of  savings  (Ashraf  et al.,  2006a;  Brune  et al., 
2013). 
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• Non-product interventions that aim to change savings behavior: This includes 
“nudges”  such  as  reminders  to  save,  as  well  as  financial  education 
interventions (Karlan et al., 2012; Song, 2013). 
The use of each approach is often  dependent on the constraints of the site for the 
field experimental evaluation. There  are  trade-offs to  having  more  comprehensive 
data on  a  range  of  welfare  impacts from  a  savings  intervention, compared with 
having less-noisy data on a subset of more narrowly-defined outcome variables. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The evidence  on the impact of  expanding  savings  access  is  promising and 
spans  a range  of development goals,  from  impacting  empowerment and  decision-
making  (Ashraf  et al., 2010), to increasing resistance to health  shocks (Dupas  and 
Robinson, 2013b),  to  promoting entrepreneurial investment and  activity  (Dupas 
and Robinson, 2013a), to increasing agricultural investment  and production (Brune 
et al., 2013). The jury is still out  on whether  and  why (certain)  households under-
save,  but  our  reading  of  the  evidence  suggests  that  it  is  well worth  pushing 
forward on these lines of inquiry. 
Going  forward,  we  think  it  is  critical  to  mesh  basic  and  applied  research. 
Under-saving, and its causes, are hypotheses that still need to be tested and refined. 
The  development of  efficient innovations and  interventions is difficult  without a 
sufficiently  deep  understanding  of  individual  and  household  decision-making, 
market functioning, and frictions, and the interactions  between the three. The broad 
interest  in the  microfinance  world  in expanding  access to  savings  products, and 
the  development  of  technology-based  solutions  for  delivering  products  and 
communicating  with  customers,  affords  researchers  with  unprecedented 
opportunities  to  create  and  implement research  designs  that build  theory-testing 
into  the  evaluation  of  innovations  or  interventions  that  seek  to  drive  savings 
behavior. 
One approach to this is to develop testable  predictions around heterogeneous 
responses  to savings treatments. Prior  work suggests that  gender, intra-household 
bargaining    power,  risk  preferences,  and  behavioral    factors  are  all  important 
mediators of treatment effects, and  further theory  and  evidence is needed  to  flesh 
out  how best to match  different  types of people,  households, and  businesses with 
different  types of savings and investment vehicles. 
A closely related  approach is to focus on specific potential barriers  to saving, 
design  “treatments”  to  chip  away  at  these  barriers,  and  then  evaluate  the 
effectiveness of these treatments. Taking  our  five broad classes of potential barriers 
or constraints as a guide, we offer several examples of avenues for future  work. 
1. Transaction Costs 
We need more testing of the marginal  effects of yields within the range  of 
market  rates.  There  has  been  more  work  on  the  effects  of  substantial 
subsidies,  but  surprisingly  little on the long-term effects of such subsidies, 
which is critical to know because the efficiency argument  for such subsidies 
hinges on habit  formation. There is also much to learn about  whether and 
how prices interact  with attention; for instance, do good deals do a kind of 
“double-duty” by making other benefits of saving more salient? The 
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development  and  spread  of  mobile  platforms offer  tremendous 
opportunities to test such questions in controlled settings  that also consider 
the effects of, and interactions with, time costs. 
2. Lack  of Trust  and Regulatory  Barriers 
Qualitatively,  the  lack  of  trust  is  self-identified  by  non-users  of  formal 
financial services as a barrier  to saving in formal  accounts. Little is known 
about  how to address this; for example, how different marketing, or product 
design, may help ameliorate such issues.  Similarly, can better information 
on  deposit  insurance  requirements  and  other  prudential  regulations 
improve  poor  clients’ trust  in  the  formal  banking  system? Can  trust  in 
formal  financial  services  be  improved  through  better  use  of  referrals 
through trusted peers  or  community actors  in existing  social  networks?  A 
number  of recent studies highlight the rapid rise in mobile phone  adoption 
and  airtime  transactions across  most  African  countries and  they  describe 
the  lower  KYC barrier to  entry  as  an  ingredient in  this  rapid expansion 
(Aker  and  Mbiti,  2010; Davidson, 2011; Jack  and  Suri, 2011a). How  does 
the  use  of  new  transaction  channels,  through  distributed  agents  and 
centralized  information  systems,  allow  for  and  enable  new  low-cost 
methods of financial transaction  monitoring  and enforcement that in turn, 
can require fewer upfront regulatory requirements without increasing banks’ 
risk exposure? 
3. Information  and Knowledge Gaps 
Mounting evidence suggests that  the increasingly standard, programmatic 
approach to financial education is misguided,  at least for adults.  Whether 
aiming to build literacy or simply  to deliver  key  pieces  of  information, 
stakeholders  should  consider  more  targeted,  focused,  and  timely 
interventions  (for  example,  those  that  are  linked  to  product  purchases). 
Interventions need not be programmatic either: marketing, messaging, and 
social learning may be more (cost-)effective levers. We certainly need more 
studies  that vary  delivery  channel/timing and/or content, within  the  same 
sample.  Many other critical  questions remain, including: how  to  harness 
spillovers  and  the  spread  of  information  and  knowledge  through  peer 
networks?   How   important are   considerations   such   as   familiarity, 
homophily,  and trust with respect to the provider  of information? How can 
herding tendencies  around social  norms be  used  to  nudge  people  toward 
better  savings  practices?  How  effective  are  product-specific  information 
programs compared to general instructions  on good savings practices? How 
can  alternative    delivery  channels  (mass  media  via  television,  or  mobile 
phones)  improve  the cost-effectiveness of financial education? 
4. Social Constraints 
There is  some  evidence  suggesting  that individuals may  make  inefficient 
choices on  savings and  investment allocations in order  to  prevent  leakage 
to  expectant social  networks. Savings  decisions  within  the  household may 
also  be  mediated by  costly  strategic behavior that reduces  efficiency and 
creates  concerns  about  inequity  (where  bargaining    power  is  unequally 
distributed). We need to develop  better  models  of how household savings 
decisions  are  made  as collective, not individual, decisions.  How  do 
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individuals  who  share  a  budget develop  common savings  norms  to 
minimize inefficient bargaining over allocations, whether  between  spouses, 
siblings, parents,  and their children? How do new savings products alter the 
control of resources within a household?  When and between whom is more 
control  preferable,  and  when  does  less  control  lead  to  better  savings 
outcomes?  A key question  on which the jury is still out  concerns  the way 
formal  savings instruments interact  with and  influence sharing  norms  and 
informal  insurance  through  traditional  social  networks.  Where  is 
crowding-out occurring and  where are complementarities to be found? 
5. Behavioral Biases 
Much  remains  to  be  done  to  understand  how  best  to  meet  behavioral 
consumers  “where  they  are,”  cognitively  speaking.  Remarkably  little  is 
known  about  which behavioral  biases actually  drive savings behavior, and 
whether  and  how  different  biases  interact  with  each  other.  This  has 
potential  implications  for  product  design;  for  instance,  we  need  to 
understand  the  extent  to  which  soft  commitment  devices  might  be 
beneficial for consumers who are overly optimistic about their prospects for 
success, compared with harder commitment devices. Another example is the 
interaction between  upfront information or decision aids and  the use of a 
behavioral intervention like a commitment device or default  option. 
Another key line of inquiry on  the  behavioral side is exploring  how to 
optimize a seductively simple behavioral innovation like “messaging” (e.g., 
reminders and/or feedback). Does  “pro-saving” messaging  actually increase 
net  saving,  or  does  the  very  psychology  (e.g.,  limited  attention)  that 
allows  messaging  to  drive  saving  or  investment behavior in  a  proximate 
sense  lead  people  to  unthinkingly  finance  their  “saving”  activity  with 
expensive  borrowing? Does  messaging  lose  its  effectiveness  over  time  as 
people tune out or more third parties compete for attention, or does it gain 
effectiveness  over  time  (or  become  superfluous)  as  people  build  habits? 
What exactly should messaging say; for example, should it be task-focused, 
progress-focused,  and/or  goal-focused?  Are  potential  savers  sophisticated 
about  how  to  best  remind  or  motivate  themselves  with  ongoing 
communications,  or can third-parties do better? Should messaging focus on 
lower- vs.  high-frequency decisions?  More broadly, more  theory, evidence, 
and innovation is needed  to  derive  the  optimal  balance  of  (or  menu  of 
options for) “auto-pilot” vs. “mindful” approaches to saving. 
Lastly, the introduction of mobile banking  introduces  various ways to 
make savings simpler. Jack and Suri’s (2011b) panel survey that  tracks  the 
adoption  and use  of  mobile-banking  in  Kenya reports that the  share  of 
user-households  who  “withdraw funds  immediately”  ’  from  their  mobile 
money  (M-PESA) account fell from  56 percent in  the  first  survey  round 
(August–October 2008) to  21 percent  in the  fourth survey round (March– 
June 2011). A general rule of behavioral  economics: the simpler a task, the 
more  likely  it  is to  be  done. In  particular, with  an  increasing number of 
direct  deposit  payments  (digital  payment transfers from  cash crop  buyers, 
remittances, incoming cash  to  a  retail  vendor, etc.),  there  are  now  more 
ways  to  automate  financial  transactions—that  is,  to  automate  what 
happens to the incoming  cash. Does it get put  aside? Does it get labeled? 
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Does  it  get  automatically  paid  out  to  specific  uses?  These  are  all 
opportunities  to embrace the reality of  human behavior, to “nudge” people 
to  decisions  that  they  themselves  would  say  they  want  to  make,  if  in  a 
moment of self-reflection. 
Developing  countries  are  also  promising  places  to  address  key  unanswered 
questions on other prominent  “pro-savings” interventions like default options, and 
kitchen-sink    behavioral    approaches  like  Save  More    Tomorrow:  can    these 
approaches be adapted “down-market”? Do they actually  increase net saving and 
wealth  accumulation over  time  (or  do  they  simply induce  substitution for  other 
savings,  or  more  debt)?  Do  they  operate  on  distinct  cognitive  or  behavioral 
pathways that  yield insights  for  the  development  of financial  products and  other 
interventions more broadly? 
In  evaluating  the  impact  of savings  models—be  they  theory,  policy,  or 
practice—it is important to recognize that convincingly measuring success or failure 
can  be difficult conceptually, and  require  substantial resources.  Most  prior work 
has  fallen  short  of  convincingly  measuring  net  savings  rates,  long-term  wealth 
accumulation,  subjective  (financial)  well-being,  or  other  outcomes that  plausibly 
capture individual, household, or  societal  welfare.  Innovations in data collection 
may be as important as more “conceptual” innovations going forward. 
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